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2 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the Latin American contributions to the origins of the Alliance for 
Progress—a massive 1960s inter-American economic development program.  It argues that, 
contrary to traditional narratives of U.S.-Latin American relations, Latin Americans played 
active roles in the founding of the Alliance for Progress.  Intellectuals, diplomats, and politicians 
asserted their influence and capability, resisted U.S. pressures, and ensured that the development 
program represented Latin American interests.  Early in the process, Latin Americans 
contributed through collaboration—economists consulted for the U.S. government and worked 
alongside U.S. social scientists.  When it was clear that the United States would put its political 
interests above Latin American development, Latin Americans leveraged U.S. vulnerabilities and 
principles of international relations to further their developmental objectives.  Ultimately, Latin 
American efforts resulted in a founding document that included a concrete financial 
commitment, protected national sovereignty, and minimized U.S. anti-communist rhetoric.   
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4 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“It is one minute to midnight in Latin America.”1  This was how former president of 
Costa Rica José Figueres explained the political and economic instability he witnessed during the 
1950s.  Threats of economic collapse and political revolution kept Latin American leaders awake 
at night.  Economies suffered from climbing inflation, deteriorating terms of trade, and 
dependence on the primary sector.2  The new democratic governments in many countries were 
weak, vulnerable to pressures from the military and a growing, discontent middle class.3   
The United States did not share Figueres’ urgency.  In the early years of the Cold War, 
the U.S. ignored developing countries that were considered to be on the periphery of the much 
larger threat—the Soviet Union.  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intervened in 
Guatemala in 1954, instigating the overthrow of the president, but other than covert operations 
such as this one, sustained policy and involvement in the region were not a priority.   
Two events at the end of the decade gave Figueres’ statement sudden meaning for the 
U.S. government.  In 1958, Latin Americans in Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela rioted and 
attacked Vice President Nixon on a goodwill tour through the continent.  The worst showing of 
anti-Americanism occurred in Caracas where an angry mob greeted the vice president, waving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Teodoro Moscoso.  “The Alliance for Progress: Its Program and Goals” (Washington, DC: Agency for International 
Development, 1963) 1. 
2 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence, Vol. 77  (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 286; The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective, ed. L. Ronald Scheman, “The Prelude” 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988); Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since 
Independence, 271. 
In Argentina, average inflation increased from 17% in the first half of the 1950s to 38%.  In Brazil the increase was 
from 18% to 28%.  Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay also suffered from high rates; Latin American countries 
experienced a steady decline in terms of trade until the 1970s, reducing purchasing power and making them less 
competitive in world markets; In 1959, coffee constituted 62% of Brazil’s export earnings, Chile: copper-71%, 
Bolivia: tin-58%, Colombia: coffee-78%. 
 
3 Between 1952 and 1958, democracies replaced the previous governments in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, 
and Argentina.   
5 
signs that read, “Go Away Nixon” and chanting “Death to Nixon.”4  People spat on him and 
threw rocks at his car—an ambush that lasted almost fifteen minutes.  President Eisenhower 
nearly sent a naval unit to rescue Nixon, but, ultimately, the U.S. government deemed 
“Operation Poor Richard” unnecessary. 
 Even more jarring to the U.S., in 1959, Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro’s 
communist revolution succeeded.  To Eisenhower, and Kennedy after, this was the ultimate 
threat—Cuba as a nucleus from which communism could emanate and infect surrounding 
nations—ones much closer to home.  This development, coupled with strong anti-U.S. sentiment 
shown during Nixon’s trip, suddenly transformed Latin America into a high priority region for 
U.S. foreign policy.  Figueres’ phrase caught fire.  To the Kennedy administration, Latin 
America was “the most dangerous area in the world,” and the uncertainty generated by 
communist influences, anti-Americanism, and poor economic and political conditions meant that 
it was always “one minute to midnight.”5 
 In response to the pressing Latin American threat, the Kennedy administration announced 
the “Alliance for Progress,” a massive inter-American economic development program.  The 
Alliance for Progress set lofty goals emphasizing industrialization, education, healthcare, land 
reform, and the promotion of democracy—meant to be accomplished with as much as $20 billion 
in aid promised by the United States.     
The standard story of the diplomatic relationship between Latin America and the United 
States follows a U.S.-centric narrative.  Most commonly, a Latin American country is threatened 
(or the U.S. deems it to be a threat), the U.S. intervenes, and the Latin American country 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Marvin R. Zahniser and W. Michael Weis, "A Diplomatic Pearl Harbor? Richard Nixon's Goodwill Mission to 
Latin America in 1958," Diplomatic History 13, no. 2 (1989): 163-19. 
 
5 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communism in Latin 
America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999) 5. 
6 
submits—either through passive cooperation or military defeat.  Traditionally, historians who 
study the Alliance for Progress take a similar route in their analysis. They focus heavily on the 
U.S. role in the program—attributing the Alliance’s origins, developments, and ultimate failures 
to actions initiated by the United States government.  It is true that, as the proprietor of the 
majority of the aid money, the United States had enormous power in the structuring of the 
Alliance for Progress, but focusing on the U.S. alone ignores the other key players in the 
founding of the program. 
 This thesis will argue that Latin Americans made significant contributions to the 
Alliance for Progress’ foundational ideology and structure.  Latin American intellectuals, 
diplomats, and politicians asserted their influence and capability, resisted U.S. pressures, and 
ensured that the development program represented their nations’ interests.  Early in the process, 
Latin Americans contributed through collaboration—economists consulted for the U.S. 
government and worked alongside U.S. social scientists.  When it was clear that the United 
States would put its political interests above Latin American development, Latin Americans 
leveraged U.S. vulnerabilities and principles of international relations to further their 
developmental objectives.  Ultimately, Latin American efforts resulted in a founding document 
that included a concrete financial commitment, protected national sovereignty, and minimized 
U.S. anti-communist rhetoric.   
This thesis will focus on events during 1961, the founding year of the Alliance for 
Progress.  The chapters proceed chronologically, showing not only how Latin Americans 
affected the founding of the Alliance, but also how and why Latin American-U.S. relations 
evolved throughout the process.   
7 
Chapter I will examine the ideological origins of the Alliance for Progress, culminating in 
an analysis of the first announcement of the program—John F. Kennedy’s address to Latin 
American diplomats and U.S. congressmen on March 13, 1961.  The chapter will provide an 
answer to why, after years of tense, almost non-existent U.S. relations, Latin American countries 
agreed to participate in the U.S.-sponsored program.  A comparison of the two major economic 
development theories in Latin America and the United States will identify the similarities that 
created the context for cooperation.  In crafting his speech, Kennedy consulted with well-known 
Latin American economists and diplomats.  The prominence of their ideas in his Alliance for 
Progress address will prove that Latin Americans played an important role in this initial stage of 
the program. 
 Chapter II will focus on the ways in which the Bay of Pigs invasion affected the founding 
of the Alliance for Progress.  It will demonstrate how U.S. aggression against Cuba altered U.S.-
Latin American relations—specifically how it changed the Latin American involvement in the 
Alliance.  Kennedy’s address had signaled a transformation in Latin American-U.S. relations that 
Latin American countries excitedly embraced.  After the Bay of Pigs, however, the countries 
checked their enthusiasm and approached diplomatic affairs with the U.S. more guardedly.  The 
chapter shows how Latin American countries used the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion to 
ultimately increase their bargaining power prior to the founding conference of the Alliance for 
Progress.   
 Finally, Chapter III will look at how Latin American countries impacted the proceedings 
and outcomes of the Conference of Punta del Este that officially established the Alliance for 
Progress.  Through an examination of conflicts and negotiations, the chapter will prove that Latin 
8 
Americans altered and added to U.S. plans for the program in ways that made the distribution of 
power within the Alliance for Progress more equal. 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
Three main approaches characterize the study of United States-Latin American relations. 
The earliest works, such as Samuel Flagg Bemis’ 1943 book, The Latin American Policy of the 
United States, utilize an American nationalist perspective, lauding U.S. actions in a part of the 
world considered backward and desperate for assistance.6  The next type of analysis takes the 
opposite approach and criticizes United States efforts in Latin America, blaming U.S. 
interventions for aggravating existing poverty, violence, and political corruption, and sometimes, 
generating new barriers to development and progress.  First used by William Appleman Williams 
in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy and later applied to U.S.-Latin American diplomatic 
history by scholars such as Walter LaFeber and Lars Schoultz, this approach dominates the 
literature.7   
The most recent trend in the historiography, that is becoming increasingly popular, is to 
study Latin American actions and agency in the region’s relations with the United States.  One of 
the first historians to do this was Friedrich Katz in his 1981 book, The Secret War in Mexico: 
Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution.8  Katz recognizes the role of Mexican 
leadership and factions in manipulating the Europeans and Americans during the Mexican 
Revolution, demonstrating that prominent Mexican figures in the war were not merely puppets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (Harcourt, Brace, 1943). 
 
7 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1988); 
Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: WW Norton & 
Company, 1993); Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
 
8 Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
9 
for the Western powers.  Instead of assuming that the U.S. government was the only purposeful 
actor in major inter-American historical events, historians, economists, sociologists, and political 
scientists are increasingly incorporating the Latin American side of the story. 
 Hal Brands takes the same approach as Katz in his 2010 book, Latin America’s Cold 
War.  Using Latin American sources and archives, Brands argues that Latin Americans had an 
active role in their relationship with the United States during the Cold War and that the history 
should be recounted as “multinational and multilayered.”9  He claims that previous accounts, 
those of scholars such as Jonathan Haslam, Greg Grandin, and John Dinges, follow in the 
tradition of the first two phases of Latin American-U.S. historiography, focusing on “the view 
from Washington.”10  This observation holds true in regards to the Alliance for Progress—a 
major example of U.S. policy in Cold War Latin America. 
The earliest analysis of the Alliance for Progress emerged not long after John F. 
Kennedy’s initial announcement of the massive economic development plan.  In 1963, two years 
following the program’s commencement, John Scott, a Time Magazine reporter, was already 
skeptical, publishing a report titled, “How Much Progress?” and citing far more “shortcomings” 
than “achievements” in his evaluation.11  Since then, historians, economists, and political 
scientists have further studied U.S.-Latin American relationships in the 1960s, attempting to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Hal Brands, Latin America's Cold War (Harvard University Press, 2010), 2.  
 
10 Ibid.; See: Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon administration and the death of Allende's Chile: a case of assisted suicide 
(New York: Verso, 2005); Greg Grandin, Empire's workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the rise of the 
new imperialism (Oxford: Macmillan, 2006); John Dinges, The condor years: How Pinochet and his allies brought 
terrorism to three continents, (New York: The New Press, 2012). 
 
11 John Scott, How Much Progress?: Alianza Para El Progreso; A Report to the Publisher of Time, the Weekly 
Newsmagazine (Time Incorporated: New York, 1963). 
 
10 
answer questions about the Alliance for Progress’ origins and chronology, and more frequently, 
taking Scott’s approach and analyzing the economic and diplomatic outcomes of the program.  
There is little disagreement regarding the origins of the Alliance for Progress.  Officially, 
the program began with the signing of the Charter of Punta del Este on August 17, 1961.  Most 
scholars also agree that, ideologically, the program drew significantly from modernization 
theory, characterized by the ideas of Walt Rostow.12  In regards to the international events and 
diplomatic efforts that shaped Kennedy’s proposal, there is general consensus that the 1960 Act 
of Bogota served as a precursor to the Alliance for Progress’ Charter of Punta del Este.  Scholars 
also agree that escalating fear of communism and increasingly negative Latin American public 
opinion toward the United States acted as major catalysts for the establishment of more concrete 
diplomatic relationships in the Western Hemisphere.  
Scholars do not agree upon a definitive date marking the end of the Alliance for Progress.  
Arthur M. Schlesinger, special assistant to Kennedy and his later biographer, stated that the 
Alliance lasted only through Kennedy’s administration, “about a thousand days, and thereafter, 
only the name remained.”13  Other scholars consider the program’s end to fall sometime at the 
conclusion of the decade, evolving throughout the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, 
and tapering off by 1970.  Trying to pinpoint the end of the Alliance for Progress is relatively 
unimportant and potentially futile.  The uncertainty around the program’s termination, however, 
is actually valuable insofar as it highlights the lack of order as the program progressed and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (Michigan State University Press: East 
Lansing, 2001); Piki Ish-Shalom, “Theory Gets Real, and the Case for a Normative Ethic: Rostow, Modernization 
Theory, and the Alliance for Progress,” International Studies Quarterly, 50 (2006): 287–311. 
 
13 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective, “Latin America: the Search for a New 
International Role.” 
11 
fact that its unraveled gradually—mirroring the steady deterioration of U.S. relationships with 
many Latin American countries. 
The most conventional approach to the study of the Alliance for Progress has been to 
analyze the program’s accomplishments, or more commonly, what it failed to accomplish.  One 
strategy, employed largely in early evaluations, emphasizes economic analysis.  This was the 
bulk of Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis’ 1970 book, The Alliance that Lost Its Way: A 
Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress.14  These early works set out to determine how 
many of the objectives of the Alliance for Progress were actually met—finally concluding that 
progress was dismal in most spheres, and when improvement was evident, it could not 
necessarily be attributed to Alliance aid. 
Once the Alliance’s failures were widely accepted, scholars started trying to understand 
why the program ultimately disappointed.  Arthur Schlesinger blames President Johnson for 
tainting Kennedy’s original plan (this did not garner support from other literature).15  Another, 
better received argument states that the Alliance for Progress was an over ambitious undertaking 
that set U.S. expectations unattainably high.  Levinson and Onis call this fault, “disillusionment,” 
and later works expound upon the idea.16  Abraham Lowenthal attributed the phenomenon of 
disillusionment to U.S. rhetoric surrounding the Alliance for Progress, saying that the language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Jerome Levinson and Juan De Onis, The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress 
(Chicago: Quadrangle books, 1970).   
 
15 Schlesinger, The Alliance for Progress, 84. 
 
16 Levinson and Onis, “The Alliance that Lost its Way.” 
 
12 
describing the program articulated unfeasible goals and moreover, the rhetoric did not align with 
how the program actually operated.17 
The majority of scholars contend that the a chief factor in the Alliance for Progress’ 
failure was the extreme degree to which the United States placed the Alliance’s goals to spread 
democracy—specifically, to prevent the spread of communism out of Cuba—above economic 
and social development objectives.  Historian Stephen G. Rabe added significantly to this 
discourse with his 1999 book, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy 
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America.  He argues that the U.S.’s obsession with 
communism, augmented by Kennedy’s own fixation, was the controlling force over Alliance 
programs and U.S. diplomacy in Latin America.    
Another approach to studies of the Alliance for Progress examines the development 
program in the context of the history of U.S. foreign policy.   Many historians have tried to 
determine whether or not the Alliance for Progress represented a defining moment in U.S. 
diplomatic strategy.18  Pravin Varaiya and Richard Walker consider the Alliance for Progress to 
be an early manifestation of 1980s U.S. counter-insurgency tactics.19  In Jeffrey F. Taffet’s book, 
Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, Taffet claims that 
the Alliance for Progress was one of the first instances of the United States employing economic 
aid to control other countries.  He argues that, although the Alliance for Progress has little legacy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Abraham F. Lowenthal, “Alliance Rhetoric versus Latin American Reality,” Foreign Affairs 48, no. 3 (1970): 
494-508. 
18 See: Federico G. Gil, “The Kennedy-Johnson Years,” United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century 
of Crisis and Challenge, 1961-1986 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988) 3-27; Joseph S. Tulchin, "The 
promise of progress: US relations with Latin America during the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson," Lyndon 
Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
211-243. 
 
19 Pravin Varaiya and Richard Walker, “Another Alliance for Progress?” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol, 19, 
No. 6 (Feb 11, 1984) 242-243.  By Pravin Varaiya and Richard Walker 
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in international economics, the politics of its foreign aid model persisted and are still used by the 
U.S. government.20   
 Studies of the Alliance for Progress follow the broader trends of scholarship on Latin 
American-U.S. relations, specifically within the Cold War period.  They primarily focus on U.S. 
objectives, U.S. management of the aid program, and often, U.S. manipulation of Latin 
American countries.  The Latin American role, however, was far more significant than typically 
acknowledged.  A number of countries and intellectuals were determined to be involved in the 
Alliance from its initiation.  They hoped that the program would truly be treated as a joint 
venture and tried to assert their own influence over operating policies and proceedings.  This is 
evident from the founding of the program—first, through input given by prominent Latin 
American economists and later, through Latin American diplomatic strategies employed leading 
up to and during the Conference of Punta del Este.  This thesis means to contribute to the 
scholarship covering the Alliance for Progress by providing more information on the roles 
played by Latin American individuals and governments in the origins of the program, situating 
itself in the most recent historiographical trend of exploring Latin American agency in inter-
American relations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: 
Routledge, 2007). 
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CHAPTER I 
STRUCTURALISM AND MODERNIZATION: OVERLAPPING THEORY AND THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 	  
 
 In the aftermath of World War II the United States pledged financial assistance to re-
build the nations devastated by the conflict.  While the U.S. focused most of its efforts on the 
Marshall Plan in Europe, post-war aid also benefited countries in other regions.21  From the end 
of World War II through the 1950s, the U.S. provided $13.6 billion in aid to Asia and the Pacific 
and $7 billion to Africa and the Near East.22  Latin America, by comparison, only received $1.7 
billion—considered by the U.S. to be the region least affected by the war.23  Douglas Dillon, 
Kennedy’s Secretary of the Treasury recalled that, this neglect was, “the cause of considerable 
resentment throughout Latin America as being unfairly discriminatory.”24  Latin American 
nations resolved to fend for themselves, adopting the attitude that Latin Americans were capable 
of charting their own advancement.  After operating under this philosophy for over a decade, in 
1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, a U.S. foreign aid 
program designed to accelerate the economic development of Latin America.  Historian L. 
Ronald Scheman called the program, “an aberration in the long history of U.S. indifference and 
neglect of its neighbors.”25  Latin Americans, however, seemed to overlook the past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The Marshall Plan provided European nations with nearly $13 billion between 1948 and 1951. 
 
22 Hernando Agudelo Villa, La Revolución del Desarrollo: Origen y Evolución de la Alianza para el Progreso 
(Mexico City: Editorial Roble, 1966) 52. 
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective, ed. L. Ronald Scheman, “The Prelude” (New York: Prager 
Publishers, 1988), 63.  
 
25 The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective, ed. L. Ronald Scheman, “The Alliance for Progress: Concept and 
Creativity,” 3. 
15 
“indifference and neglect” and responded to the Alliance for Progress with overwhelming 
support and optimism.   
While many factors contributed to Latin America’s backing of the Alliance, economic 
development theory played an especially large role.  The Alliance for Progress drew primarily 
from two ideologies.  “Structuralism” was the influential development theory in Latin America.  
It posited that underdeveloped nations faced structural economic barriers to progress—barriers 
unintentionally produced by the policies of developed nations.  Structuralists advocated for more 
inward-focused, protectionist policies to eliminate the issues generated by contact with larger, 
more prosperous countries.  “Modernization,” the popular development theory in the United 
States, on the other hand, did not consider protectionist policies to be a viable solution to 
underdevelopment.  Modernization theorists defined an evolutionary process by which nations 
become “modern” or “developed,” and argued—contrary to structuralism’s position—that 
increased interactions with developed nations would actually improve and accelerate the process.  
While there were other theories circulating at the time, the two highlighted in this chapter and 
their intellectual proponents received the most support from their respective regions; and 
moreover, they both garnered significant attention from John F. Kennedy’s administration.   
Despite certain marked differences in the Latin American and U.S. theories, there were 
also noteworthy areas of overlap.  Structuralism and modernization dovetailed in their promotion 
of industrialization and other instruments of development.  Also critical, each theory recognized 
foreign capital as a practical source for the monetary base needed to undertake imperative, yet 
costly, development initiatives.  This chapter will argue that the commonalities between 
modernization and structuralism, and the way the Kennedy administration utilized them, helped 	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create the context in which the United States and Latin America could cooperate in founding the 
Alliance for Progress.  To provide understanding for why this context was crucial for inter-
American cooperation, this chapter will first look at the build-up of anti-American sentiment and 
increasing economic self-sufficiency in Latin America during the post-war period.  Next, the 
chapter will give an overview of both theories and the intellectuals who created them, comparing 
and contrasting key components.  Finally, an analysis of John F. Kennedy’s first announcement 
of the Alliance for Progress will demonstrate how the program’s ideological foundations 
depended upon ideas from both theories. 
By combining aspects of the two ideologies, and consulting Latin American development 
economists, the Kennedy administration capitalized on the opportunity provided by the 
theoretical similarities of structuralism and modernization.  Inclusion of Latin American ideas 
from the very beginning of the program not only captured Latin American trust and support, but 
also gave intellectuals and governments in the region a prominent role in the founding of the 
Alliance.  Although John F. Kennedy first proposed the Alliance for Progress, the earliest 
conceptions of the program truly represented a joint effort, one highly influenced by decades of 
Latin American thought and ambition.         
In order to get to this cooperative point, however, the United States needed to find a way 
to address its poor reputation in Latin America.  U.S. neglect of the region from the end of World 
War II through the late 1950s generated anti-American sentiment.  Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbor Policy had become obsolete.  Populist movements in Latin America, such as 
those in Peru, Mexico, and Argentina often promoted anti-American attitudes.  In 1946, 
Argentine politician Juan Perón encouraged and played upon negative feelings towards the 
United States with his campaign slogan, “Braden or Perón?,” positing himself against the U.S. 
17 
Ambassador to Argentina Spruille Braden, and suggesting that his Argentine opponent had close 
U.S. ties.  Perón won the election with this highly successful strategy—a powerful demonstration 
of how much Argentineans distrusted the United States and disliked the idea of the nation’s 
involvement in Latin American affairs.     
In many Latin American countries, the public displayed anti-American opinions 
violently.  From 1956 to 1965, 65 out of the 171 reported “anti-American demonstrations, riots, 
and terrorists attacks” took place in Latin America.26  In 1958, the riots and attacks on Richard 
Nixon in Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela finally captured U.S. attention, and the Eisenhower 
administration began to renew interest in Latin America.27  John F. Kennedy continued this 
effort.  Within three months of his inauguration, Kennedy announced the creation of the Peace 
Corps, which would have volunteers in Latin America by the end of the year.28  He also vowed 
to create an inter-departmental task force to coordinate Latin American affairs and send a “Food 
for Peace” mission to the region.  His worldwide popularity was already much higher than that of 
Eisenhower and the trend held true in Latin America.29  Still, one year of U.S. interest in the 
region did not guarantee Latin American support for the Alliance for Progress.   
Latin Americans had spent the post-war period accustomed to minimal interaction with 
the United States and had grown increasingly self-sufficient.  The founding of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) represented this trend and demonstrated a growing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ivan Krastev and Alan L. McPherson, The Anti-American Century (Budapest: Central European University Press, 
2007) 3. 
27 In 1960, the U.S. signed the Act of Bogota, pledging to participate in an inter-American commitment to fund 
economic and social development.  Eisenhower later asked Congress for $500 million for this effort.  The Act of 
Bogota is often considered a precursor to the Alliance for Progress. 
 
28 The first Peace Corps volunteers in Latin America were stationed in Chile and Colombia in December 1961. 
 
29 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in 
Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) xv-xvii. 
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emphasis on regional autonomy.  The governments of Chile, Cuba, and Peru first proposed 
ECLA in 1947 in response to the UN creation of economic commissions for Asia and Europe.  
The United States, with the support of the Great Britain and Canada argued that a corresponding 
Latin American group would be redundant because of the existence of the Pan-American Union, 
the precursor to the Organization of American States.  The UN approved the Latin American 
proposal, however—thanks to Chile’s argument that the Pan-American Union was primarily 
political and that the creation of ECLA would provide a much-needed, economic entity.30   This 
was momentous in that it made ECLA the first regional organization to concentrate purely on 
Latin American affairs, as opposed to Pan-American issues.   
The UN officially founded ECLA in 1948, with the purpose to contribute “to the 
economic development of Latin America, coordinating actions directed towards this end.”31  The 
vague mission reflected the fact that ECLA had little direction or organization, and without the 
support of Western powers, the early commission maintained a fragile existence.  The quality of 
the economists it attracted, however, quickly strengthened ECLA’s role and influence.  Top 
Latin American social scientists, representing a wide variety of countries, came together under 
the direction of renowned Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch.32  Within a year of the 
organization’s founding, Prebisch wrote and published ECLA’s first report, which would form 
the foundation of structuralist theory in Latin America.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Edgar J. Dosman, The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch: 1901-1986 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
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31 ECLAC, “The Institution,” United Nations, 2000-2013, www.eclac.cl/acerca/default-i.asp.  
 
32 Prebisch originally turned down a leadership position with ECLA.  Gustavo Martinez Cabañas from Mexico 
served as the first Director-General until Prebisch assumed the position in 1950, holding it until 1963.  Other ECLA 
economists included: Celso Furtado (Brazil), José Antonio Mayobre (Venezuela), Juan Noyola and Victor Urquidi 
(Mexico), Regino Boti and Eugenio Castillo (Cuba), Pedro Vuscovic and Jorge Ahumada (Chile).   
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Prebisch’s work drew from economic policies that had been operating in Latin America 
since the 1930s.  Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), an eventual hallmark of 
structuralism, characterized economic strategies in multiple Latin American nations.  ISI policies 
focused inward and stressed replacing imports with domestically produced primary goods and 
manufactures.  The larger economies—specifically, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Uruguay—that had the capital and stability to start developing small-scale industry, 
implemented ISI policies in reaction to global economic downturns.33  They aimed to better 
protect Latin American countries from external economic shocks, suggesting that even before the 
U.S.’s post-war snub, Latin American nations recognized ways to profit from self-reliance. 
The events of the decades that followed further justified the implementation of ISI 
policies and the idea that Latin American countries prospered when economically independent.  
In response to the recovery after the Great Depression and the global market effects of World 
War II, Latin American governments strove to build up the industrial sectors of their economies, 
finding success to the extent that between 1939 and 1945, industry as a share of GDP grew by 
5.7%.34  Even though their manufactured goods were generally of a lower quality, Latin 
American countries found export markets both within the continent and outside, benefitting from 
the fact that the traditional industrial powerhouses such as the United States and Great Britain 
focused more of their production efforts on wartime necessities.  The end of the war, and the 
revival of U.S. and European manufacturing, decreased the demand for Latin America’s 
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In Argentina, the expansion occurred primarily in the textile industry, while steel manufacturing in Brazil boomed.  
Across the larger economies of Latin America, oil refineries, plastic factories, and chemical plants contributed 
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products.  This economic blow only further supported the belief that Latin American countries 
needed to protect themselves from fluctuations in the international market. 
Although Latin American governments widely implemented structuralist policies in the 
1930s and 1940s, during this time, they followed no defined economic theory.  Immediately after 
arriving at ECLA, Raúl Prebisch finally organized the ideas that had been controlling Latin 
American economic policies in “The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal 
Problems,” ECLA’s first major publication.  Prebisch, previously an economics professor and 
Argentina’s Deputy Minister of Finance, became known as the “Father of Structuralism” and the 
report was commonly referred to as “The Prebisch Manifesto.”  The Prebisch Manifesto 
provided novel explanations for Latin American underdevelopment.  Furthermore, it articulated 
the economic theory behind the ISI policies that were already in-use and altered it, suggesting 
that under structuralism, country-specific protectionism was not necessary.  Instead, Latin 
American countries could continue to thrive by implementing regional policies.35 
Prebisch’s “The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems” 
emphasized a division between Latin America and the United States.  The report separated the 
world into two economic zones, the “center” and the “periphery.”  Center nations were 
industrialized and included countries such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, and 
Great Britain.  The countries on the periphery were underdeveloped with economies that 
traditionally relied on the export of primary commodities (all of Latin America).  According to 
Prebisch, and ECLA by extension, the unequal terms of trade between the center and periphery 
created a cycle that prevented the periphery from achieving significant economic growth.  
Prebisch felt that GDP per capita, or average income, was the best determinant of economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Prebisch promoted trade agreements among the countries of Latin America, eventually helping to found LAFTA 
in 1960. 
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progress.  He asserted that, in order to raise average income, Latin American countries needed to 
increase productivity and capital savings—and suggested that industrialization and regional 
cooperation were the best ways to do so.36        
The Prebisch Manifesto’s explanation for why countries on the periphery remained 
underdeveloped was radical.  The document contended that development and industrialization in 
the center nations and the center’s associated economic policies caused the relatively stagnant 
economic growth of Latin American countries.  The Prebisch Manifesto specifically discussed 
how the policies of the “principal center,” the United States, obstructed development in the 
periphery.  Prebisch explained how high U.S. productivity negatively impacted Latin American 
countries, stating:  
The United States is a powerful and well-integrated economic entity and has become so 
largely through its own deliberate effort, the great significance of which is recognized.  
One cannot overlook, however, the fact that this brought about, for the rest of the world, 
conditions incompatible with the functioning of international economy in the same way 
as before the First World War, when the British center strictly observed the rules of the 
game in the fields of monetary policy and foreign trade.  It is under these new conditions 
of international economy, that the process of industrialization has begun to develop in 
Latin America.37  
 
Prebisch’s language in this passage is diplomatic.  He first acknowledges the “deliberate effort” 
it took the U.S. to become industrialized before suggesting that these efforts ultimately generated 
the inequality of the current world economic order.  The mention of the U.S.’s break from “the 
rules of the game” refers to U.S. implementation of protective tariffs and wage increases that 
prevented the benefits of economic growth from transferring to peripheral nations.38  According 
to Prebisch, the previous “principal center,” Great Britain, had not implemented these types of 	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38 Ibid., 16. 
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measures, explaining why the development gap increased so much more when the United States 
rose to international supremacy.  With some tact, Prebisch essentially accused the United States 
of creating underdevelopment and hardship in Latin America, forcing the peripheral countries to 
industrialize.  
To combat the problems perpetuated by the economic policies of the center, ECLA 
proposed regional integration efforts, arguing that Latin American countries should work 
together to be the agents of their own development.  Prebisch’s refusal to merge ECLA with the 
OAS had been a firm display of his faith in Latin American agency as well as his definition of 
economic “regionalism.”  The regional cooperation he and ECLA promoted excluded North 
America in the sense that it did not support subscribing to policy measures imposed or devised 
by the United States.  In “The Economic Development of Latin America,” Prebisch wrote: 
It does not seem advisable, however to rely exclusively upon measures taken by the 
principal cyclical center [the United States], since in the case of a contraction in that 
country, firm action on the part of the peripheral countries could be very opportune.  The 
Latin American countries should, therefore, prepare to play their part in the common 
task.39   
 
Not only did Prebisch warn Latin American countries to avoid economic entanglement with the 
United States because it protected them from the ripple effects of downturns, but also because 
economic independence allowed them to take advantage of opportunities created when U.S. 
market presence weakened.  He did not prescribe national protectionist policies, but regional 
ones, calling the economic policies he proposed part of “the common task.”  To Prebisch and 
ECLA, due to a shared history and similar levels of development, Latin American governments 
faced comparable economic challenges, ones that could be tackled together.      
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Not surprisingly, the United States disapproved of the ideas espoused in “The Economic 
Development of Latin America.”  According to Prebisch, a cable arrived from New York 
conveying the message: “The report is a document with a great content.  But it speaks about 
development, industrialization, terms of trade, and many other matters that ECLA is not 
supposed to deal with.”40  The United States’ cable proposed that very few economic issues 
should be left under ECLA’s jurisdiction.  Evidently, the U.S. had still not warmed to the idea of 
a solely Latin American organization—one the United States could not supervise.  U.S. 
disapproval was again made clear at an inter-American conference where Raúl Prebisch first 
presented his manifesto.  While other Latin American countries sent some of their most 
important diplomats, the U.S. sent the Ambassador to El Salvador as its head of delegation.41  To 
have such a low-ranking official represent the United States was an obvious slight.      
Prebisch recalled earlier U.S. attempts to curtail ECLA’s authority.  At a cocktail party a 
U.S. ambassador approached Prebisch, offering to merge ECLA with the OAS, sending the 
message that, “My government does not like two organizations dealing with the two same 
problems.”42  Prebisch recounted his response as follows:   
The basis of our new organization, ECLA, is intellectual independence.  This is the first 
opportunity for Latin Americans to start thinking with their own minds on economic 
problems.  This has not been the case up to now…I have to tell you frankly that you 
would be the dominating power in the new organization, as you dominate the 
Organization of American States.43   
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Raúl Prebisch was clearly wary of U.S. influence.  He pointed out that the United States had a 
strong tendency to overpower international relationships.  Proud of the “intellectual 
independence” endorsed by the existence of ECLA, Prebisch did not want it hindered or 
discredited by U.S. intervention.  Most importantly, refusal to merge with the United States-
dominated OAS demonstrated Prebisch’s confidence in the ability of Latin Americans to “start 
thinking with their own minds.”   
A number of Latin American governments also felt assured that the region could prosper 
without U.S. interference, and accordingly, stood by Prebisch’s resistance to the merger 
proposal.  At a conference in 1949, a U.S. delegate again pushed for the combining of ECLA and 
the OAS.  The Mexican Secretary of Finance reviewed the proposal and ripped it up.  Shortly 
after, the President of Brazil published a letter declaring Brazilian support for an independent 
ECLA.44   
Following these incidents, the United States ceased its efforts to abolish ECLA.  The 
attention and legitimacy ECLA earned from the Prebisch Manifesto made the organization’s 
demise a much more difficult task.  Prebisch had become an academic and political celebrity in 
Latin America and nearly every country reached out to his organization for economic policy 
recommendations.45  Moreover, Latin America remained low on the list of U.S. concerns.  
International development had begun to generate interest in the United States, but recently de-
colonized countries in Africa and Asia were given higher priority, due to perceived threats 
associated with the instability of their young governments.  Therefore, U.S. intellectuals 
designed their development theories with the needs of all underdeveloped nations in mind.  As a 	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result, modernization theory was less tailored to Latin American circumstances, a fact that likely 
gave the United States government further cause to consult Latin American economists. 
U.S. modernization theory emerged out of a cross-disciplinary evolution of ideas.  
Modernization started in the field of sociology.  Political scientists, historians and economists 
later adopted and adjusted the ideas—trying to define the universal characteristics of the 
development process and then map their progression.  The social scientists then hoped to be able 
to design policies to expedite the process.  Prominent modernization theorists in the United 
States worked together at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Center for 
International Studies (CIS).  Founded in 1952 with CIA funding, CIS was arguably the American 
counterpart to ECLA’s brain trust.  Many of the men who worked there later went on to serve in 
the Kennedy administration, often focusing on Latin American affairs.46 
Like in structuralism, modernization separated countries into categories—either 
“modern” or “traditional.”  To move from traditional to modern, countries went through a series 
of linear steps.  Walt W. Rostow, an economic historian at CIS, developed the most widely 
accepted explanation of this pathway.  In his 1960 book, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto, Rostow identified five stages, referring to the first, undeveloped stage as 
the “traditional stage” and the last, modern stage, as the stage of “high mass consumption.”  He 
called the stages in-between, “preconditions for take-off,” “take-off,” and “drive to maturity.”  
According to Rostow, most developing nations were stuck in the “preconditions” stage, where 
technology was improving, production surpluses existed and investment and savings were rising.  
Achieving “take-off” was Rostow’s goal for developing nations.  In this stage, the manufacturing 
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sector grew significantly in a few main industries, technological improvements sped up, and 
capital savings rates increased to 10% or more of national income.  The United States and 
Britain, according to Rostow, were at this stage in the late 1700s and early 1800s, respectively, 
putting Latin America and other developing regions one to two centuries behind.47  
The title of Rostow’s book, “A Non-Communist Manifesto” exposes the underlying U.S. 
reasons for studying economic development.  Rostow and the other theorists at CIS saw 
modernization theory as an alternative to the social revolution offered by the Soviet Union and 
communism.  In a memo to Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, Rostow said that, “Free world 
success in seeing the underdeveloped countries go through their difficult transition to self-
sustaining growth would deny to Moscow and Peking the dangerous mystique that only 
communism can transform underdeveloped societies.”48  The idea that the “free world” needed to 
play a role in this “difficult transition” was a critical component of modernization theory.  
Modernization theorists emphasized that democracy was central to development, giving their 
theory a political edge.  This contrasted with structuralism, which did not prescribe a specific 
political or social doctrine as being integral to successful development.   
As a model democracy, to many modernization theorists, the United States also 
represented the “modern” model for developing countries.  The theorists believed that simple 
contact with the U.S. and other Western, democratic nations, promoted development.  Rostow 
called this the “demonstration effect.”49   This idea, that interaction between “modern” and 
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“traditional” countries accelerated the development process, went directly against structuralism’s 
claim that economic relationships between developed and undeveloped nations had generated 
and perpetuated underdevelopment.  Rostow even considered abrasive contact, such as invasion 
and imperialism to be strong forces of modernization, saying that, “…reacting against intrusion 
from more advanced nations-has been a most important and powerful motive force in the 
transition from traditional to modern societies.”50  
The “demonstration effect” reveals the U.S. sense of superiority intrinsic to 
modernization theory.  The United States saw its efforts as noble, leading Michael E. Latham to 
call modernization theory a form of “Manifest Destiny.”51  Latham argues that modernization in 
the United States was not just a social, political, and economic theory, but also, “an ideology, a 
conceptual framework that articulated a common collection of assumptions about the nature of 
American society and its ability to transform a world perceived as both materially and culturally 
deficient.”52  If Latham is correct, the U.S. perspective was that Latin America’s 
underdevelopment was partially due to it being inherently lesser than the United States.  Yet 
again, this aspect of modernization conflicted with structuralism, specifically ECLA’s promotion 
of and confidence in Latin American intellect and ability.   
The discrepancies between modernization and structuralism were not minor.  The two 
development camps disagreed about the causes of underdevelopment, the inclusion of political 
and social ideology, and the effects of interaction between developed and underdeveloped 
nations.  Yet, even with these disagreements, the theories overlapped in a number of areas—	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specifically regarding the requirements and instruments necessary to advance development.  
Both theories advocated that industrialization was critical to reach the status of a modern, 
developed economy.  In order to industrialize, they agreed that nations needed high levels of 
investment and capital savings.  Finally, and most importantly, modernization and structuralism 
recognized that foreign aid was one of the best means by which to achieve the build-up of 
industry and capital.  These congruencies ultimately overpowered the conflicting portions of the 
two theories during the construction of the Alliance for Progress.    
Modernization and structuralism both considered industrialization essential to economic 
development.  In “The Economic Development of Latin America,” Prebisch asserted that, 
“Industrialization has become the most important means of expansion.”53  He supported this 
claim by explaining that industrialization created jobs, which increased the overall productivity 
of a nation.54  Rostow agreed.  In The Stages of Economic Growth, he highlighted the importance 
of industrialization during “take-off,” the stage of growth in which a country starts developing.  
He explained that, “new industries expand rapidly…and those new industries, in turn, stimulate, 
through their rapidly expanding requirement for factory workers, the services to support 
them....”55 Both Rostow and Prebisch deemed industrialization to be critical to job creation and 
economic productivity. 
 The two theorists also stressed that their emphases on industrialization did not discount 
the importance of agriculture within developing economies.  In fact, they believed that 
industrialization was linked to increased agricultural productivity.  Prebisch emphasized that, 	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“The industrialization of Latin America is not incompatible with…the mechanization of 
agriculture.”56   Technological advancement in agriculture increased production and exports, in 
turn, bringing in capital that could support the build up of industry.  In the same way, Rostow 
clarified that, within modernization theory, “‘manufacturing’ is taken to include the processing 
of agricultural products or raw materials by modern method.”57  He echoed Prebisch’s reasoning 
behind the importance of agriculture, stating that, “…its processes set in motion a chain of 
further modern sector requirements and that its expansion provides the potentiality of external 
economy effects, industrial in character.”58   
Plans for industrialization and the mechanization of agriculture were futile without funds 
to support them.  Modernization and structuralism both asserted that development required large 
amounts of capital accumulation—through savings and investment.  One of the ways Rostow 
delineated his “stages of growth” was by the percentage of national income that investment and 
savings constituted.  To reach the next stage and become increasingly “modern,” countries had to 
increase their investment and savings levels (between 5-10% of national income in “take-off,” 
rising to 10-20% during “drive to maturity”).59  While not quite as specific, structuralist theory 
also placed enormous weight on capital accumulation.  In “The Economic Development of Latin 
America” Prebisch maintained that, “The raising of the standard of living of the masses 
ultimately depends on the existence of a considerable amount of capital per man.”60   
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Recognizing the importance of capital, both theorists also realized the enormous 
challenge in raising sufficient funds.  Rostow had been advocating for years that foreign aid was 
the solution to underdevelopment and would promote U.S. diplomatic interests.  He again 
emphasized this conviction in The Stages of Economic Growth, stating that, “…the present level 
of external assistance is substantially inadequate…” and advocated for $4 billion of aid annually 
to cover all the underdeveloped countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.61  
Rostow’s suggestion corresponded to modernization theory’s premise that the involvement of 
developed countries in underdeveloped country’s affairs accelerated and facilitated development. 
 On the surface, foreign aid may not have seemed to be as compatible with structuralism.  
Prebisch, however, understood the urgent need for capital, and reasoned that foreign financial 
assistance was one of the most accessible sources.  He argued that, “An immediate increase in 
productivity per man could be brought about by well directed foreign investments added to 
present savings,” admitting that, “The temporary help of foreign capital is necessary.”62  The fact 
that Prebisch qualified foreign aid as “temporary” showed that he expected the inter-dependent 
relationship to also be transitory, making it possible to still preserve the autonomy of Latin 
American nations.  While all of the similarities between modernization and structuralism 
contributed to U.S.-Latin American cooperation under the Alliance for Progress, Raúl Prebisch 
and ECLA’s acceptance of foreign aid was the most important.  Approval from Latin America’s 
prestigious economic organization—one that had already demonstrated its commitment to 
regionalism and the protection of Latin American economic wellbeing—had the potential to 
generate support for the Alliance throughout Latin America.  Following ECLA’s rise to 	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prominence in 1949, its influence permeated the governments and economies of most Latin 
American countries.  In addition to providing economic consulting services, many ECLA 
officials took governmental positions.63  Ideologically, due to ECLA’s influence, most Latin 
American governments were poised to accept foreign aid for economic development.  The 
Kennedy administration just had to present the program in a way that resonated with the citizens 
and governments of both Latin America and the United States.  
President Kennedy recognized the importance of appealing to both U.S. and Latin 
American conceptions of economic development.  To take advantage of the opportunity 
presented by the overlaps between structuralism and modernization, he enlisted the help of the 
intellectuals who developed the theories.  Starting before his inauguration, Kennedy consulted 
with Raúl Prebisch and continued to include the Argentinean economist in almost every step 
leading to the official announcement of the Alliance for Progress.  Prebisch described his 
involvement in the Alliance as follows: “…I was not the promoter of the AFP, but I jumped on 
the wagon when the train was starting to move....The Organization of American States, during 
Kennedy’s early years attempted to introduce new life into itself, and formed a committee of 
some 15-20 people, the majority of whom were Latin Americans.”64  The committee Prebisch 
mentioned was Kennedy’s Latin American task force and included a number of members of 
ECLA.  Kennedy’s inclusion of Latin American economists and his re-organization of the OAS, 
which had been out of favor in Latin America, helped convince Prebisch to “jump on the 
wagon.”  Prebisch was a powerful figure for Kennedy to have supporting the Alliance.    
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In addition to Prebisch, Kennedy also consulted with Latin American diplomats, 
economists, and politicians.  He called José Antonio Mayobre, Venezuela’s ambassador to the 
United States, asking for suggestions for a speech on United States-Latin American relations.  
Mayobre enlisted extra support and together, Felipe Pazos, a Cuban economist who had worked 
for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and recently denounced Castro, Felipe Herrera, the 
first president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Jorge Sol, an economist for the 
Organization of American States (OAS), and Raúl Prebisch, submitted a short proposal for a 
foreign aid program.65  In Prebisch’s words, the group urged the White House, saying, “This is 
the moment to act: to have a hemispheric policy toward Latin America.”66  Kennedy heeded their 
advice as well as their program proposal—using the majority of it in the Alliance for Progress’ 
founding speech.  
Walt Rostow also provided Kennedy with advice before the announcement of the 
Alliance.  At this point in time, Rostow was the Deputy Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, serving in the U.S. government along with many of his other modernization theorist 
colleagues from CIS.  On February 28, 1961, a few weeks before Kennedy unveiled the Alliance 
for Progress, Rostow sent the president a memo criticizing Eisenhower’s policies toward Latin 
America and like the Latin American intellectuals, Rostow suggested that Kennedy implement a 
new approach, a “…free world effort with enough resources to move forward those nations 
prepared to mobilize their own resources for development purposes.”67  Rostow devoted the rest 
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of the memo to outlining the “technical characteristics” of a program, arguing that it was “the 
only path that makes sense.”68  Kennedy used a number of Rostow’s suggestions, and even 
consulted him a final time during a meeting the morning of March 13, 1961, hours before 
Kennedy officially unveiled the Alliance for Progress. 
Kennedy’s March 13 speech weaved together the advice he had received from 
modernization and structuralist theorists, attempting to draw support from the U.S. and Latin 
American members of his audience.  Early in the speech Kennedy proclaimed, “We meet 
together as firm and ancient friends, united by history and experience and by our determination 
to advance the values of American civilization.”69  Throughout, Kennedy tried to emphasize this 
idea of a single “America,” rather than refer to two distinct regions of “North” and “South” or 
“Latin.”  By doing so, Kennedy worked to expand Raúl Prebisch and ECLA’s idea of 
regionalism to include the United States, arguing that U.S. interests were more compatible with 
those of Latin America than was traditionally thought.  
The fact that dovetailing modernization and structuralist ideas saturated Kennedy’s 
speech also helped to make this point.  For most of his address, Kennedy explained a ten-point 
proposal for a foreign aid-sponsored development program.  It included the promotion of 
industrialization, mechanization of agriculture, technology, education, and land reform—
strategies supported by both modernization and structuralism.  The president also called upon 
Latin American countries to drive these efforts, which strongly appealed to the self-sufficient 
attitudes held by ECLA and most Latin American nations.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
68 Ibid. 
 
69 John F. Kennedy, “President Kennedy Speaks on the Alliance for Progress: Addresses and Remarks—The First 
Year,” Address at the White House; before Latin American Diplomats, Members of Congress, and their Wives, 
March 13, 1961. 
34 
 One of Kennedy’s obvious nods to structuralism was his statement that, “The United 
States is ready to cooperate in serious, case-by-case examinations of commodity market 
problems.  Frequent violent changes in commodity prices seriously injure the economies of many 
Latin American countries, draining their resources and stultifying their growth.”70  Although he 
did not go as far as to hold the U.S. responsible for market problems, Kennedy did admit that 
market fluctuations limited the advancement of Latin American economies.  These “frequent, 
violent changes” in commodity prices were the reason Latin American countries resorted to 
protectionist policies and tried to push the center nations out of economic development efforts.  
By promising to try to address market problems, Kennedy indirectly acknowledged the 
legitimacy in structuralist theory’s accusations against U.S.  This helped to set a new tone for 
inter-American relations—one in which U.S. priorities did not necessarily take precedence. 
In addition to wooing his Latin American audience, Kennedy had to secure the support of 
American theorists, Congress, and the public.  In the Cold War era, this required appealing to the 
U.S. anti-communist psyche.  Kennedy did this subtly, using modernization rhetoric, and calling 
for a “revolution of the Americas.”71  Modernization theorists believed that they offered an 
alternative “revolution” to that proposed by Marxism and the Soviet Union.  Kennedy tried to 
make this idea appeal to Latin Americans by drawing parallels between U.S. and Latin American 
revolutionaries, proclaiming, “…we call for social change by free men—change in the spirit of 
Washington and Jefferson, of Bolívar and San Martín and Martí—not change which seeks to 
impose on men tyrannies which we cast out a century and a half ago. Our motto is what it has 
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always been—progress yes, tyranny no - Progreso si, tirania no!”72  The cry, “Progreso si, tirania 
no!” directly mimicked the popular anti-American slogan in Cuba at the time, “Cuba si! Yanqui 
no!”73  This reference made it clear that Kennedy was advocating for a U.S. solution to 
development issues, not one offered by the tyrannical governments of the Soviet Union and 
Cuba.  By denouncing Cuba in conjunction with the mention of Bolívar, San Martín, and Martí, 
Kennedy suggested that following in Cuba’s path would mean diverging from the vision of the 
fathers of Latin America.  Through this obvious stance against Cuba, Kennedy not only assured 
his U.S. audience, but also communicated to Latin Americans that communism did not fit, nor 
would it be tolerated, within the Alliance.	  
 Despite the political overtones and anti-communist messaging in Kennedy’s speech, 
Latin American governments responded to the Alliance for Progress with enthusiasm.  President 
Rómulu Betancourt of Venezuela said, “…the White House is beginning to speak a language that 
has not been heard since the days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.74  President Frondizi of 
Argentina wrote an open letter to President Kennedy applauding the proposal.75  Like 
Betancourt, Frondizi felt that Kennedy’s announcement signaled a significant shift in U.S. 
policy, stating in an interview that, “The Alliance for Progress implies a political and economic 
change in the attitude of the United States towards Latin America.”76  The governments of 
Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Mexico also sent messages to Washington to express 
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their support.77  Within a few weeks of the speech, nearly 20 political leaders had signed a 
hemispheric declaration urging all the nations of Latin America “to accept a friendly hand” from 
the United States.78 
The Latin American hope and support generated by Kennedy’s March 13 speech 
represented a remarkable feat.  Only a few years after Latin Americans staged anti-U.S. protests 
and violently assaulted Vice President Nixon, the entire region was coming together to join in a 
U.S.-sponsored development program.  ECLA’s influence on the language and content of 
Kennedy’s address played a crucial role.  Although Kennedy talked of “revolution,” the Latin 
American ideas he espoused were already well established in the region, dating back to policies 
from as early as the 1930s.  By incorporating influential Latin Americans and their ideas into the 
design and decision-making process, the Kennedy administration legitimized the program in the 
region, winning Latin American trust and convincing governments that the Alliance for Progress 
truly marked a new era in inter-American relations.  
 The promise of aid money through the Alliance for Progress was also an enormous 
selling point, and ECLA’s involvement in the construction of the program helped to justify 
accepting the aid.  Latin American regionalism had become far more popular than Pan-
Americanism and gave rise to movements towards Latin American intellectual independence and 
self-reliance.  ECLA’s endorsement of foreign aid in its structuralist policies sanctioned U.S. 
financial support.  If ECLA, a symbol of regionalism and independence, approved of the 
Alliance for Progress, Latin American countries could assume that participating in the program 
and accepting foreign aid would not jeopardize their autonomy. 	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 President Kennedy had pledged $500 million in foreign aid in his speech, and, by 
announcing that his vision was for a ten-year plan, he implied that this amount was only a 
beginning.79  The U.S. Congress, responsible for appropriating the funds, was less inclined than 
Latin American governments to support this announcement.  Opportunely, foreign aid was 
inextricably linked to both structuralism and modernization.  Modernization theorists had been 
making the case for increased aid since the mid-1950s.  Their argument that foreign aid was 
crucial for developing and stabilizing countries appealed to U.S. Congressmen, many of whom 
saw funding the Alliance for Progress as being in the interest of U.S. national security. 
 By rooting the Alliance for Progress in a combination of U.S. and Latin American 
ideologies and consulting intellectuals from both regions, John F. Kennedy created a sense of co-
ownership of the program.  He referred to it as “a vast cooperative effort,” and, as of March 13, 
1961, this was truly the case.80   The potential of the Alliance for Progress dissipated previous 
tensions between Latin America and the United States.  Contrary to the typical historical 
narrative, the Alliance for Progress was not solely a U.S. idea.  A significant portion of its 
ideological foundations can be attributed to Latin American intellectuals.  Cooperative efforts 
among governments and development theorists ultimately generated a proposal that represented 
the thoughts and interests of both regions. 
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CHAPTER II 
INCREASED LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POWER IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
THE BAY OF PIGS 	  
 
“Cuba si, Yanqui no!”  “Viva Cuba y abajo el imperialismo yanqui,” “Fidel, Fidel!”81  In 
the days following the United States invasion of Cuba on April 17, 1961, Latin American cities 
erupted into protest and violence.  The chants that overtook the crowds were reminiscent of those 
that greeted Vice President Nixon on his 1958 goodwill tour through Latin America; they 
represented attitudes toward the United States that the Kennedy administration had been trying to 
quash.  Latin American nations had recognized and responded positively to the U.S. 
government’s apparent shift in policy, articulated in John F. Kennedy’s speech on March 13.  A 
few weeks after, the Brazilian newspaper, “O Estado de São Paulo,” reported that, “the basis and 
secret of the prestige of the new leadership in Washington had been founded on the belief that 
U.S. intervention had been finally eschewed in the era of the ‘Alliance for Progress.’”82  The Bay 
of Pigs proved this belief to be wishful thinking.   
The unprovoked attack on Latin American soil induced anxiety among the other countries 
in the region.  Salvador Allende, a Chilean Senator and later President of Chile, admitted, “If the 
United States could subject Cuba today, there would be no independent future for Chile.”83  The 
U.S. however, had not subjected Cuba.  One of the most powerful nations in the world had lost to 
a small island.  While many Latin American countries did fear the implications of U.S. 
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willingness to invade the region, Cuba’s victory was encouraging.  Rather than show deference 
to the United States to avoid being the next target, Latin American countries responded with 
vitality—strongly supporting regionalism and defending the rights to self-determination and 
national sovereignty.  The attack also revealed to Latin Americans that the eradication of 
communism was still the United States’ predominant goal, so much so that the country was 
willing to break international agreements to achieve it.  Seizing upon this vulnerability, Latin 
American countries used their positions toward Cuba as a political tool.  This chapter will argue 
that the Bay of Pigs paradoxically increased the diplomatic power of Latin American nations 
leading into the founding conference of the Alliance for Progress.  An analysis of warnings prior 
to the invasion and of the negative Latin American reactions will prove that the Bay of Pigs 
severely tarnished the new U.S. reputation in Latin America and discontinued any blind 
optimism generated by the Alliance for Progress announcement.  A final examination of a few 
brief, but significant, incidents before and during the founding of the Conference of Punta del 
Este completes the chapter, showing that the events of April 17-19, 1961 gave Latin American 
countries pause and infused them with a sense of greater power leading into the discussions.    
When John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency, preparations for an invasion of Cuba 
were already well under way.  The task force responsible for the attack first met on March 9, 
1960, and President Eisenhower authorized the initial plan eight days later.84  The CIA formally 
briefed Kennedy for the first time on January 28, 1961, bringing the new president into the inner 
circle after months of strategizing had already transpired.85  In the period that followed, the 
Kennedy administration made significant adjustments, and President Kennedy’s support 	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oscillated.  He approved the final plan on April 12, with the condition that he could cancel it 
anytime before 12:00 p.m. on April 16.  When noon of April 16 arrived with no objection from 
the president, the CIA received the go-ahead.  Kennedy would later ask, “How could I have been 
so stupid as to let them proceed?”86  The next day, 1511 men, primarily Cuban exiles trained by 
the CIA, using weapons provided by the United States, landed at Bahía de los Cochinos, “the 
Bay of Pigs.”  John F. Kennedy decided to call off the planned air support, leaving the troops on 
the ground to fend for themselves.  Within three days, Cuban defense forces had indisputably 
triumphed—killing 114 exiles and capturing 1189.  U.S. historian Theodore Draper called the 
incident, “the perfect failure.”87   
Before Kennedy’s final decision to carry out the mission and invade Cuba, a number of 
U.S. officials advised against the attack on the basis of possible diplomatic repercussions.  
Chester Bowles, Kennedy’s Under-Secretary of State, wrote a memorandum asking that 
preparations cease.  It stated: 
…our national interests are poorly served by a covert operation of this kind at a time 
when our new President is effectively appealing to world opinion on the basis of high 
principle…In sponsoring the Cuban operation, for instance, we would be deliberately 
violating the fundamental obligations we assumed in the Act of Bogota establishing the 
Organization of American States (OAS)….  To act deliberately in defiance of these 
obligations would deal a blow to the Inter-American System from which I doubt it would 
soon recover.88   
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The specific “obligations” to which Bowles referred can be found in Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the 
“Charter of The Organization of American States.”89  The articles establish the economic, 
political, and territorial sovereignty of the members of the OAS (Cuba was still a member in 
1961), specifically condemning military action.  The United States, with the support of Latin 
American consultants, had already determined that the OAS would preside over the Alliance for 
Progress.90  Bowles suggested that ignoring the OAS bylaws would delegitimize the Pan-
American organization.  If the United States would not respect the OAS, the Kennedy 
Administration could not expect Latin American countries to recognize the organization’s 
authority in its pending management of the joint economic development program.  Bowles called 
attention to the hypocrisy of an attack against a Latin American country in light of the recent 
friendly developments in U.S.-Latin American relations. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Edward Lansdale also had his 
reservations.  He told Kennedy’s adviser Richard Goodwin, “There is no way you can overthrow 
Castro without a strong, indigenous political opposition.  And there is no such opposition, either 
in Cuba or outside of it.”91  Lansdale was a strong proponent of deposing Castro, later serving an 
instrumental role in Operation Mongoose, another plot to purge Cuba of communism.  Still, even 
he saw the folly in pursuing the attack without the backing of the “indigenous” Latin American 
population, and more importantly, recognized that Latin American loyalties did not lie with the 
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United States over Cuba.  Secretary of State Dean Rusk agreed that there was not enough public 
opposition to Castro, and went even further, suggesting that an attack would generate 
opposition—toward the United States.  He cautioned Kennedy, “We might be confronted by 
serious uprisings all over Latin America if U.S. forces were to go in.”92  The recognition by high-
level U.S. government officials that an attack on Cuba would be ill-received and disturb U.S.-
Latin American relations suggested not only that relations were vulnerable, but also, that there 
was reason to believe that regional loyalties were stronger than those to Pan-American 
commitments. 
In addition to ignoring warnings from U.S. officials, Kennedy and the CIA disregarded 
indications from Latin American governments that they would condemn an attack on Cuba.  
Towards the end of the Eisenhower administration, U.S. diplomats approached President Arturo 
Frondizi of Argentina and asked for support for potential military action against Cuba.  Frondizi 
expressed strong disapproval.93  Brazil reacted to the Kennedy administration’s efforts similarly.  
In early 1961, Adolf Berle, head of Kennedy’s interdepartmental task force on Latin America, 
visited Brazil in an attempt to recruit Brazilian support for U.S. action against Cuba.  John Moors 
Cabot, U.S. ambassador to Brazil recalled that President Jânio Quadros was highly offended.94  
Berle repeatedly offered a bribe of $100 million—more if needed.  Quadros refused three times, 
and when Berle returned to the United States the next day, no one from the Brazilian government 
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accompanied him to the airport, a decision that Cabot considered “rather a slap.”95  Quadros’ 
deliberate disrespect and Frondizi’s outright rejection of the U.S. entreaty showed that, to Latin 
American countries, merely the suggestion of military intervention in the region merited 
impudence.  
The incident annoyed Quadros so much that he alluded to the conversation in a speech a 
few weeks later.   He asserted that part of Brazil’s foreign policy was to “reinforce peace and 
reduce international tensions,” reinforcing his stance against military aggression in Cuba.96  
Quadros proclaimed Brazil’s right to sovereignty and self-determination throughout his remarks, 
and also stated that, “The ideological position of Brazil is Western and it will not change.  The 
recognition of this truth, however, does not define our foreign policy.”97  By saying this, Quadros 
sent a message to Washington.  Although Brazil was democratic and had friendly relations with 
the United States, it did not mean that the government would act against nations merely because 
they did not hold the same political values.   
Although clearly opposed to military intervention in Cuba, Latin American governments 
were willing to collaborate with the United States to find a non-violent way to address the 
communist nation.  Prior to April 17, a number of Latin American officials had been in 
conversation with the United States, developing strategies to peacefully confront Fidel Castro’s 
government.98  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico were some of the countries advising a 
conciliatory policy toward Cuba.  Quadros and Frondizi went as far as to offer to mediate 
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discussions between Castro and Kennedy.99  Yet, other than the vague discussions with the 
Brazilian and Argentine presidents, the nations received no notice of the invasion.  After the 
extensive consultation of Latin Americans in preparation for the Alliance for Progress 
announcement, this was an unexpected frustration.  Latin American leaders had tried to believe 
that Kennedy would hold true to his word and welcome them into the decision-making process 
of inter-American policy.  Disregarding the advice of Latin American nations, countries the 
United States had solicited for input, was especially insulting.  Furthermore, the consultation and 
subsequent collaboration with ECLA economists during the earliest developments of the 
Alliance implied to Latin American nations that they would continue to play a larger role in 
future inter-American relations.  The seeming retraction of this responsibility was slighting; it 
left Quadros, Frondizi, and other Latin American political figures more guarded, and drove them 
to find alternative ways to exert their influence. 
Latin American governments responded to the attack as Quadros and Frondizi’s earlier 
reactions indicated they might.  President of Mexico Adolfo López Mateos spoke against the 
attack because it violated the principles “of non-intervention and respect of the national 
sovereignty of the people.”100  Quadros reasserted his support of “the principles of self-
determination of the people and complete sovereignty of nations.”101 “National sovereignty,” 
“self-determination,” and “non-intervention” were common themes in Latin American responses 
to the Bay of Pigs.  As mentioned in Chapter I, Latin American governments had become 
accustomed to running their own affairs and were determined to maintain their autonomy.  They 	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used non-intervention as both a way to avoid involvement in the Cuba-U.S. dispute and to 
condemn the Bay of Pigs.  They commonly cited that non-intervention was central to the OAS 
Charter.  The President of Ecuador, José Velasco Ibarra, used this logic in his denunciation of the 
invasion, declaring, “…the mercenary invaders that attacked Cuba and the instigators of the 
attack have trampled on all of the principles of international law and all the judicial norms of 
Pan-America.”102   
Reactions against the Bay of Pigs were not confined to the political sphere—the attack 
incensed the Latin American public as well.  In Mexico, a group of university students sacked 
the North American Cultural Institute in the small town of Morelia, destroying President 
Kennedy’s photograph and burning the U.S. flag.  The destruction of U.S. national symbols 
demonstrated that the protesters were not just backing Cuba; they were vehemently opposing the 
United States.  The chant shouted in cities across Mexico further illustrated the divisive nature of 
the Bay of Pigs.  Protesters yelled, “Cuba si, yanquis no!,” the exact phrase that President 
Kennedy countered when he proclaimed, “Progreso si, tirania no!” on March 13, hoping the 
Alliance for Progress would make this expression and accompanying feelings obsolete.103  The 
echo of “yanquis no!” throughout Mexico, however, illustrated that the Bay of Pigs cancelled out 
whatever advancements had been achieved in the weeks following the Alliance announcement.  
Furthermore, it demonstrated that Mexicans feared for their sovereignty and the sovereignty of 
the region more than they feared the wrath of the United States. They stood in solidarity with 
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Cuba, proving that Latin Americans still valued the regional relationship among the countries of 
Raúl Prebisch’s “periphery.”   
The largest demonstration occurred in Mexico City where 30,000 people gathered to hear 
former president Lázaro Cárdenas speak.  Cárdenas had been a crucial figure in the Mexican 
Revolution and later served a successful presidency.  Mexicans held him in the highest esteem, 
considering him to be a champion of the people.  Addressing the agitated crowd, Cárdenas 
declared, “We summon you, to adopt the most energetic attitude in the face of this cowardly 
aggression by the imperialists, of which the sister republic of Cuba is now victim.”104  This 
statement is important, first, in its classification of the United States as “imperialist.”  Latin 
Americans feared being dominated by outside influences and had already demonstrated a strong 
desire to take control of their own affairs.  Collaborating with an aggressive, imperialist nation 
threatened to work against the region’s previous advances in asserting and obtaining autonomy.  
The second critical part of Cárdenas’ statement was his characterization of Cuba as Mexico’s 
“sister republic.”  To Mexico, and other Latin American nations, with or without communism 
and Castro, Cuba was still a part of the Latin world.  In 1961, most Latin American nations still 
felt a cultural and historical bond with Cuba that was stronger than the one Kennedy was 
attempting to fabricate.  Cárdenas asked the Mexican people assembled to stand by Cuba, saying, 
“What Cuba urgently needs is the moral support of Mexico and of all Latin America.  We must 
give her that, because Cuba is in the midst of a struggle of great impact for all of the nations of 
this continent.”105  Cárdenas’ call for regional unity was to prepare for “a struggle of great 
impact” against the United States.  
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 Latin American opposition to the Bay of Pigs extended beyond Mexico.  Protestors made 
their anti-U.S. sentiments clear, targeting buildings with American ties the way that Mexican 
students had stormed the cultural center.  Protestors in Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, and Ecuador 
attacked U.S. embassies and consulates.  In Guatemala, demonstrators stoned the offices of the 
United Fruit Company and Pan American Airways.  Angry Venezuelans also attacked the Pan 
American headquarters in Caracas, bombing the building after doing the same to General 
Electric offices. In Argentina, irate citizens pelted bricks at the First National City Bank of New 
York.106 
 The demographics of the protestors were similar in every country.  In many instances, 
workers’ unions lead the movements against the United States and in solidarity with Cuba.107  
The largest union protest occurred in Chile where over 300,000 union members across the 
country participated in a 24-hour walkout.108  University students staged many of the other 
demonstrations.  Students in Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, and Brazil protested on their campuses 
and in the streets.109  Some student groups even started volunteer lists through which their peers 
could sign up to travel to Cuba to help defend the nation from U.S. imperialism.110  Ironically, 
these were two of the groups that Kennedy had explicitly targeted in his March 13 speech: “And 
so I say to the men and women of the Americas- to the campesino in the fields, to the obrero in 
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the cities, to the estudiante in the schools—prepare your mind and heart for the task ahead…”111 
Although the Kennedy administration would deal with upper-class government officials and 
intellectuals when ironing out the details of the Alliance for Progress, the U.S. felt that support of 
the middle and lower classes was instrumental to the success of the program.    
The United States’ greatest fear in Latin America was that more countries would follow 
Cuba’s example and instigate their own communist revolutions.  In this sense, discontent among 
the masses was arguably just as troubling to the United States as was government-level 
condemnation of the invasion.  In an interview with George F. Sherman (a reporter present at the 
Conference of Punta del Este and later foreign service officer), Sherman described the U.S. 
diplomatic attitude toward Latin America at the time:          
Castro was positioned to take advantage for his own purposes of this very fast moving 
situation in Latin America. We [the United States] were up against it. We were saying 
that the past is over and we want to build a new relationship with you in Latin America, 
taking advantage of the rising middle class….The rationale of the Alliance for Progress 
was that if you gave aid to the emerging middle class, which was supporting the forces of 
democracy, that would help stabilize the country.112 
 
The United States felt that true development and change would come from the middle and lower 
classes.  Thus, the widespread demonstrations of union workers and students presented a serious 
issue.  To the United States government, these were the people most susceptible to external 
influences, and, because of the Bay of Pigs, the U.S. feared that Castro’s message was more 
persuasive.   
President of Colombia, Alberto Lleras Camargo, commented on the effect of the public’s 
support of Cuba.  He recalled, “At this time there existed an intense political pressure originating 	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from the events that unfolded in Cuba, one of these episodes being the disaster and recent 
invasion of the island….The enormous multitudes of agitated and hopeless Latin 
Americans…seemed to find a solution for their struggles in the bold actions of Cuba.”113  The 
political pressure to which he referred applied to both Latin American governments and the 
United States.  For the governments of Latin America, their responsibility was, according to 
Camargo, “to direct all of the national energies and available resources to resolve the social and 
economic imbalance.”114  This was each country’s objective in signing on to the Alliance for 
Progress.  The “available resources,” however, were not sufficient to rapidly improve the lives of 
the masses.  Consequently, Camargo explained that the pressure put on the United States was, 
“to offer a substantial economic contribution to development in a part of the world in which, 
without this help, there would be a series of conflicts that would culminate in uncontrollable 
political disorder, truly opposite the spirit of the West.”115  The “spirit of the West” was that of 
democracy.  While leaders like Camargo did have reason to fear extreme political agitation 
within their countries, their worries did not compare to the United States’ fervent fears of Cuban 
influence and deteriorating democracy. 
Cowed by the overwhelmingly negative reactions to the Bay of Pigs and unable to assess 
how much control the U.S. would have over the upcoming Alliance for Progress conference, 
President Kennedy sent three of his most prominent advisers, Adlai Stevenson, Lincoln Gordon, 
and Ellis Briggs on a 17-day mission.  The purpose of this trip was to meet with heads of state, 
assess the damage caused by the Bay of Pigs and discuss the upcoming conference on the 	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Alliance for Progress.116  Kennedy deliberately chose Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations, to lead the trip.  Immediately following the invasion, the United Nations 
investigated Stevenson and concluded that he had no previous knowledge or involvement in the 
Bay of Pigs planning.  This made him a less-biased envoy that would hopefully be accepted 
more favorably and be better poised to re-secure Latin American support.   
This did not prove to be the case.  In Chile, Stevenson’s arrival met with protests 
chanting, “Stevenson, Go Home!” and, again, “Cuba si!  Yanqui no!,” indicating that Latin 
American sentiment towards the Bay of Pigs had not cooled.117  Upon his return, Stevenson 
reported that, indeed, Latin Americans had not forgotten the Bay of Pigs, stating, 
“Nonintervention is a religion throughout Latin America and insofar as this impatient attempt by 
Cuban exiles can be construed as American intervention, which it is—it is unpopular—
unpopular in South America.”118  Latin American governments stood their ground on the Cuba 
question, continuing to refuse to violate the OAS bylaws and intervene in another nation’s 
affairs.  None of the countries with which Stevenson met ended up breaking ties with Cuba 
before the conference.  Upon Stevenson’s return, the New York Times reported that he was “an 
envoy, not a magician,” and that “South America was not transformed by Stevenson’s charm.”119   
 After his trip, Stevenson also strongly advised the U.S. government to shift its emphasis 
from communism and the Cuban issue to economic and social development.120  This suggestion 
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indicated that Stevenson had sensed the Latin American realization that communism consumed 
the United States’ focus in the region, calling into question its commitment to the goals of the 
Alliance for Progress.   José Figueres, the former President of Costa Rica and a strong supporter 
of the Alliance for Progress, announced this exact fear after the Bay of Pigs, “that U.S. attention, 
riveted on Cuba, might be seriously diverted from the pressing social and economic problems of 
the entire hemisphere.”121   
The United States’ responses to the chaotic aftermath of the Bay of Pigs did little to alter 
Figueres’ perception.  After a U.S. Embassy investigation into the destruction and looting of the 
North American Cultural Institute in Morelia, the government ultimately blamed the incident on 
the Soviet Union, despite dubious evidence of any Soviet involvement.122  Soviet culpability 
excused the Mexican public as well as the slow-to-respond Mexican authorities of virtually all 
guilt.  This highlighted the U.S. fixation with the Soviet Union.  Latin American countries 
could—and did—take advantage of this obsession, leveraging communism to manipulate the 
United States. 
Colombia and Brazil both used this tactic in preparation for the Conference of Punta del 
Este.  A memo following a meeting with President Kennedy and Brazil’s Minister of Finance 
explained that the Finance Minister, “declared that timely U.S. aid will give Quadros needed 
financial strength and will improve his ability to take a firmer political position vis-à-vis the 
communists… He [Quadros] will almost certainly continue to oppose OAS or US intervention in 
Cuba, and is unlikely to turn on Castro as long as the issue provides him with considerable 
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leverage with the US.”123  The United States pinpointed Quadros’ strategy, but could not counter 
it.  They needed to maintain a friendly relationship with Brazil, the largest economy in Latin 
America for the Alliance for Progress to proceed.  Quadros stayed true to the principles of “non-
intervention” and “self-determination” that he had previously asserted, refusing to intervene in 
Cuba’s affairs and not allowing the United States’ pressure to alter Brazil’s foreign policy.  
Moreover, he found a way to do so that provided him with “considerable leverage,” and 
potentially, considerable capital. 
President Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia also tried to exploit the U.S.’s communist 
fixation.  At his meeting with Adlai Stevenson, Camargo suggested that if the U.S. government 
“made a clear financial commitment at Punta del Este, Colombia would develop Latin American 
support for a political conference on Cuba.”124  Stevenson speculated that Camargo’s 
forthcoming cooperation was due to a sudden financial need.  The U.S. Trade and Development 
Department had refused a Colombian loan request on the grounds that the country had exceeded 
its annual quota.125  Alliance for Progress aid would not be subject to the same quota, so 
Colombia, holding less power than Brazil as a considerably smaller nation, hoped to secure 
funding by offering the United States the anti-Cuban support of multiple Latin American 
countries.  
The support Colombia offered did not come together in time for the official founding of 
the Alliance for Progress.  The Conference of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
(IA-ECOSOC) met in Punta del Este, Uruguay from August 5 to August 17, 1961.  The nearly 	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two weeks yielded “The Charter of Punta del Este,” which officially established the Alliance for 
Progress.  The document set out specific development goals: accelerated industrialization, 
increases in agricultural productivity, agrarian reform, higher literacy rates, improved life 
expectancies, inflation monitoring, and wider access to low-cost housing.  Due to varying needs 
across countries, governments had to submit a state-specific development plan before receiving 
aid money.  The delegations decided that, to realize the proposed objectives, countries needed to 
maintain an economic growth rate of 2.5% per capita per year, a lofty goal.126   
The events of April 1961 certainly played a role in the proceedings and outcomes of the 
Conference of Punta del Este.  Some Latin Americans still harbored negative feelings toward the 
United States for its decision to invade.  Felipe Pazos, one of Kennedy’s original consultants for 
the Alliance, “ostentatiously refused to acknowledge Richard Bissel.”127  Bissel was one of the 
primary architects of the Bay of Pigs invasion.  Pazos had been the President of the Central Bank 
of Cuba, but turned against Castro and left Cuba in exile in early 1961.  An anti-communist 
opposed to Castro, Pazos still found U.S. actions contemptible.  President Frondizi of Argentina 
explicitly told Adlai Stevenson, “that he blamed the Bay of Pigs fiasco in part for unfavorable 
conditions within the OAS and for collective action on the Cuba question.”128  The “collective 
action” to which he referred was in fact inaction.  At the end of the August conference, Cuba still 
held its membership in the OAS, and the most influential Latin American nations (Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico, Chile) continued to maintain diplomatic ties with the communist country.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 U.S. Department of State, “Alianza Para El Progreso: The Record of Punta del Este,” Title I (Official documents 
from a Special Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the Ministerial level in Punta del 
Este, Uruguay, August 5-17, 1961). 
 
127 Dosman, The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch, 361.  
 
128 Sheinin, Argentina and the United States, 120.  
 
54 
Reflecting on the proceedings at the Conference of Punta del Este, U.S. reporter George 
Sherman highlighted Brazil’s diplomatic strategy, saying that, “Brazil, particularly, was very 
nationalistic and very resistant to condemning Castro, quite rightly seeing that Castro was a good 
lever for them to use in dealing with the United States.”129  Argentina had also pressed the U.S. 
for funding to stabilize its economy before it would agree to break with Cuba.130  Summarizing 
his observations, Sherman stated that the United States thought: 
…that everything that happened in Latin America was done by or for Fidel Castro, and it 
wasn’t true. But, forces down there were perfectly willing to let the United States go on 
thinking that because it was their way of promoting their own importance…their chief 
lever in getting aid and everything else out of the United States.131   
 
Sherman recognized that the U.S. obsession with Cuba effectively increased Latin American 
diplomatic power.  To the United States, healthy relations with Latin American nations were 
vital because they could sway the Cold War struggle in the region.  The Bay of Pigs loss only 
made this struggle more urgent and further promoted the value of strong relationships with other 
Latin American countries.  As developing nations, Argentina and Brazil did not have many other 
resources that they could use to exert influence over the structuring of the Alliance for Progress.  
In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, the realization that their stance on Cuba could serve as 
diplomatic leverage gave Latin American nations a better bargaining position.   
In an inflammatory address at Punta del Este, Che Guevara, the head of Cuba’s 
delegation, said that any loans Latin American governments would receive from the Alliance for 
Progress would, “bear the stamp of Cuba.”132  His claim was not completely unfounded.  The 	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attitudes and actions of Latin American countries at the Conference of Punta del Este evidence 
the influence that Latin Americans gained and astutely wielded in the aftermath of the U.S.’s 
invasion of Cuba.  The Cuba situation taught a number of nations that their position towards 
Fidel Castro’s government could be a powerful diplomatic tool.  Unlike in the traditional 
historical narrative of U.S.-Latin American relations, military aggression in the region did not 
weaken Latin American governments or cause them to roll over and let the United States take 
advantage.  They reacted shrewdly, recognizing how the Bay of Pigs defeat and subsequent 
popular reactions amplified U.S. fears of communist infiltration of the region and capitalizing 
upon the opportunities that this generated.   
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CHAPTER III 
LATIN AMERICAN VICTORIES AT THE CONFERENCE OF PUNTA DEL ESTE 
 
 
Nearly five months after John F. Kennedy’s White House address, delegations from 20 
Latin American nations answered his call and assembled in Punta del Este, Uruguay to draft the 
documents that would form the basis of the Alliance for Progress.  The United States arrived to 
the Special Meeting of the Inter American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) with 35 
representatives, led by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon.  During the months leading up 
to the meeting, many of the original Latin American and U.S. intellectuals responsible for the 
details of Kennedy’s speech came together to draw up position papers and draft the founding 
documents.133  The cooperation present in Washington was an encouraging sign for the United 
States.  Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the subsequent backlash, the U.S. needed 
affirmation of Latin American support and willingness to compromise.  The Alliance for 
Progress was Kennedy’s second chance to demonstrate that his administration could manage its 
ambitious endeavors in Latin America. 
The landscape in Punta del Este, however, did not mirror that present in Washington.  
The intellectuals of the ECOSOC task forces working in D.C. could not fully represent nor 
anticipate the wishes of every Latin American nation.  Each delegation for the 20 Latin 
American countries, including one from Cuba lead by Che Guevara, arrived with its own 
adamant country-specific agenda and misgivings about the United States’ commitment to Latin 
American relations.   
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Historian Jeffrey F. Taffet wrote that the Conference of Punta del Este only had a “veneer 
of Latin American control,” suggesting that, ultimately, the United States managed the dealings 
with few significant obstacles or inauspicious compromises.134  This chapter will challenge the 
idea that Latin Americans made negligible contributions to the discussions and outcomes of 
Punta del Este.  In reality, Latin American countries compelled the United States to concede to a 
number of demands that not only significantly shaped the founding charter, but also suggested a 
more equal distribution of power within the Alliance for Progress.  Issues of program financing 
and national sovereignty generated the most conflict.  Through outright obstinacy, alliance 
building, calculated logic, and even blackmail, Latin American delegations successfully and 
creatively wielded their influence throughout the nearly two-week conference.  The conference 
ended with the signing of the Charter of Punta del Este, which enumerated the official goals of 
the Alliance for Progress and the means by which to achieve them.  The document reflected 
major Latin American diplomatic victories, promoting Latin American interests, and in some 
cases, upsetting U.S. visions for the development program.  
The commencement of the conference made it immediately clear that Latin American 
countries would maintain the steadfast commitment to the “self-determination” and “non-
intervention” that they had espoused in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.  In his opening remarks, 
the President of Uruguay, Eduardo Haedo, forcefully reasserted Latin American nations’ 
worthiness and desire for responsibility within the Alliance for Progress.  He proclaimed that, 
“Those who think we gathered here with a beggarly attitude are mistaken.  We all feel capable of 
continuing to fight for democracy and the betterment of our peoples even without this 
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conference.”135  The term, “beggarly,” was key.  Haedo did not want to give the impression that 
Latin American countries were dependent upon the United States.  Bucking colonialism and 
imperialism, the Latin American governments genuinely expected to develop collaborative 
relations, not ones of meek acceptance and compliance.  Haedo went out of his way to emphasize 
this with the especially bold statement that Latin American countries could handle their affairs 
“without this conference,” effectively meaning, “without the United States.”   
In reality, rapid economic development without U.S. aid money would have been an 
insurmountable challenge for most countries, and they recognized this.136  Later in his address, 
the President of Uruguay alluded to the U.S. financial role in Latin American development. 
Careful not to contradict his previous statement, Haedo suggested that U.S. involvement was the 
North American nation’s moral duty, avoiding the implication that Latin American progress 
relied upon U.S. aid.  He declared, “Never before have the powerful nations, whose prosperity 
was founded in the poverty of the underdeveloped nations, had a responsibility so concrete and 
clear.”137  By saying this, Haedo echoed ECLA’s structuralist theory, suggesting that “the 
powerful nations,” specifically the United States, were in part to blame for the struggles facing 
Latin Americans, and concurrently, the need for a massive development program.  Through his 
insinuation that the United States played a part in Latin American underdevelopment, he implied 
that the U.S. somehow owed economic assistance to the region.  At the initiation of the Punta del 
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Este proceedings, Haedo established that the U.S. role was not above that of Latin American 
countries.  He portrayed the United States as a financing partner, with shared responsibility for 
the problems in question.  This relationship differs from the historical notion of the United 
States’ role in international relations as either a benevolent protector, or worse, an imperialist 
administrator.     
As Haedo makes clear, to most countries in the Alliance, the United States’ primary 
responsibility was to supply capital.  President Kennedy first formally proposed this role, so his 
administration was in full agreement.  Discord, however, stemmed from the question of exactly 
how much aid the U.S. would be accountable for providing.  Prior to the conference, President 
Kennedy stated that the United States would guarantee $1 billion in the first year of the 
program.138  The U.S. preparatory teams debated fixing a number before the Punta del Este 
discussions, but ultimately decided against it.139  One reason for this decision was that the U.S. 
Congress had not yet approved long-term funding for the program.  A number of Kennedy 
advisers worried that this could create tension in Washington and would also lead to an amount 
that was an imprecise speculation.140  Following this logic, Secretary Dillon conservatively 
repeated Kennedy’s “at least 1 billion” figure in the United States’ opening remarks in Punta del 
Este.141 
This ambiguity did not satisfy Latin American delegates.  Many pressured Dillon to make 
a long-term commitment, doubting U.S. investment in the program.  At the end of August 5, the 
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first day of the conference, Secretary Dillon wrote a memo to John F. Kennedy relaying the 
collective feelings of Latin American countries, identifying that the “single overriding 
preoccupation of all is [the] extent of U.S. commitment.”142  Dillon explained that, “Latins point 
out that they must take drastic steps in tax reform and land reform and devote more funds to 
development.  This process will be greatly facilitated if they can feel confident that once they 
have done their part adequate foreign aid will be available.”143  The United States had previously 
made it clear that, in order for the Alliance for Progress to function, Latin American countries 
needed to institute reforms.  Demands for a serious, long-term financial figure proposed an 
exchange agreement—Latin American countries would agree to do their part, developing and 
implementing plans for these reforms, if they knew that their efforts would not be in vain and 
that the United States would uphold its end of the bargain. 
During the preparations for the conference, Felipe Pazos, the Cuban economist who had 
defected from the Castro government, warned the Kennedy administration that Latin American 
countries would be reluctant to cooperate without a long-term aid figure.  He stated that, “Latin 
America is no longer like the savage tribes of Africa to be bought off with trinkets.”144  Pazos’ 
comment sheds light on Latin American self-perception.  The nations in the region saw the 
Alliance for Progress and their foreign aid relationship with the United States as different from 
that of other developing nations.  This perception was likely further enforced by the common 
comparison of the Alliance to the Marshall Plan—implemented in Europe to assist more-
developed, or fully developed countries. Considering themselves above other developing nations, 
and nearly on par with Europe meant that Latin American countries felt that the Alliance for 	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Progress relationship would be one among near-equals; consequently, in their minds, they 
deserved respect, responsibility, and candor. 
The United States should have heeded Pazos’ advice.  On the third day of the conference, 
Douglas Dillon gave into Latin American pressures and provided the countries with the 
assurance they wanted.  To the cheers of the other delegates, Dillon revealed that, “…Latin 
America, if it takes the necessary internal measures, can reasonably expect its own efforts to be 
matched by an inflow of capital during the next decade amounting to at least $20 billion.”145  
Although his phrasing was rather noncommittal, qualifying the aid amount by saying that Latin 
Americans could “reasonably expect” $20 billion, Dillon’s announcement represented significant 
progress for Latin American countries.  First and foremost, the amount dwarfed historical U.S. 
aid in the region.  Between 1945 and 1950, U.S. aid in the Americas was estimated at only 1.7 
billion.146  The figure’s presence in the official charter was also noteworthy.  Having a monetary 
value, in writing, and approved by the 20 signatories of the Charter of Punta del Este, added 
legitimacy to the program.  More importantly, it seemed to hold the United States and the 
international organizations partnering in the program accountable, officially binding them to the 
joint mission of the Alliance. 
Dillon’s $20 billion announcement was not the United States’ only financial concession 
in Punta del Este.  The U.S. also approved the addition of a clause for “Immediate and Short-
Term Action Measures,” responding to requests for provisions for “emergency funding.”  The 
vision for the Alliance and the preliminary drafts of the charter emphasized that development 
projects would be of detailed, long-term government planning.  The United States did not intend 	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to offer Alliance for Progress aid money for development initiatives that had not been clearly 
thought out within the context of greater, overarching objectives.   
President Eduardo Haedo changed the U.S. position quickly.  Already displaying 
considerable nerve in some of the inflammatory rhetoric in his opening speech, Haedo 
implemented a strategy that the U.S. could not ignore—he threatened to pull Uruguay from the 
conference proceedings.  As the host of the IA-ECOSOC session, such a move would have been 
highly disruptive and potentially fatal to the discussions.  Secretary Dillon called Haedo’s play 
“pure blackmail.”147  He qualified the incident as “disagreeable in the extreme,” but 
acknowledged that, “Uruguay…was in a position to exert pressure and chose to do so.”148  
Seeing the effect that Uruguay’s antics had, other smaller nations such as Paraguay, El Salvador, 
Haiti, Bolivia, Panama, and Ecuador backed Haedo and argued that they also required the access 
to immediate funds.149  This collective effort resulted in a section of the Charter of Punta del Este 
providing for a supply of immediate aid money totaling approximately $150 million.150  
Countries that felt they required such aid would have to apply for funds within 60 days of the 
signing of the Charter and then the U.S. would, “take prompt action on applications for such 
assistance.”151 
 In many ways this small addition was a major change to the Alliance for Progress.  From 
the ideological origins of the Alliance to the final U.S. preparations weeks before, long-term 
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economic planning had been the cornerstone of the development program’s philosophy.  Both 
Prebisch’s structuralism and Rostow’s modernization heavily stressed long-term planning.  In an 
explanation of his work, Prebisch stated that, “The structural changes inherent in 
industrialization require rationality and foresight in government policy and investment in 
infrastructure to accelerate growth, to obtain the proper relation of industry with agriculture and 
other activities, and to reduce the external vulnerability of the economy.  These were strong 
reasons for planning.”152  To Prebisch, the market system would not solve the economic 
challenges facing Latin America—governments had to be proactive.  Planning was critical, 
especially with foreign aid involved.  In his 1949 manifesto, Prebisch wrote, “…it would seem 
imprudent to renew the active flow of investments…without adopting a plan to deal with the 
series of concrete problems which arise in this connection.”  In such a plan, “the types of 
investment best suited to the development of Latin-American economy…may be considered in 
co-operation with the individual countries concerned.”153  Prebisch asserted that, although 
necessary, foreign aid complicated development when not used judiciously.  Due to the range of 
development needs of all Latin American countries, he stressed the importance of country-
specific planning to better cater to each set of problems and use foreign capital efficiently.   
Walt Rostow also felt that extensive planning should accompany foreign aid.  In his 1956 
work, “A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy,” Rostow defined specific criteria 
necessary to determine whether a developing country should receive foreign aid.  One key 
requirement was that, “the receiving country must have an over-all national development 
program designed to make the most-effective use of its resources; this should include not only a 	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series of interrelated capital projects, but also necessary educational and training programs.”154  
The immediate aid clause in the Charter of Punta del Este provided for stand-alone “emergency” 
projects, and thus, did not fulfill Rostow’s criteria that funding contribute to an “all-over national 
development program.”  The 60-day request period was not sufficient time to make 
comprehensive spending plans and to tie them to greater term goals.  This was especially true 
considering that the countries requesting the loans were the smaller, less-developed nations, 
which Adlai Stevenson had previously noted were far behind countries such as Argentina and 
Brazil in their pre-conference development planning.155  The immediate aid clause went against 
the philosophies of economic development upon which the Alliance for Progress was conceived 
and undermined a fundamental component of the U.S.’s program design. 
 President Eduardo Haedo’s “blackmail” and the resulting addition to the Charter of Punta 
del Este translated into approximately $10 million for Uruguay in the construction of schools, 
health centers, and roads.156  Considering that Uruguay’s GDP in 1960 was only $1.2 billion, this 
was a serious figure for the small Latin American nation.157  This was significant because, 
generally, the larger, more economically powerful Latin American countries spearheaded the 
successful movements against U.S. proposals—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico tended to 
dominate the conference.  Uruguay and its small nation allies’ victory demonstrated to the 
United States that the less-powerful Latin American countries could not be overlooked.  At the 
beginning of the conference, the head of Panama’s delegation reminded his delegates that they 
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could, “put pressure on the United States.”158  The small countries saw an opportunity to follow 
this advice, and did not shy away from it.  Although $150 million was rather insignificant 
compared to the total aid under the Alliance for Progress, the small countries in Punta del Este 
sent a memorable message to the United States. 
Once the delegations had settled financial conflicts, and Latin American nations—large 
and small—felt reassured that they had the capital to carry out necessary reforms, attention 
shifted to the execution of the Alliance.  Despite the addition of available short-term aid, the vast 
majority of projects funded under the Alliance were to be part of long-term initiatives.  
Accordingly, the Alliance needed a mechanism by which to organize and streamline the aid 
requests and approval process.  The U.S. originally proposed to create a permanent OAS 
standing committee to oversee and review the development plans of individual nations.  Referred 
to as both the “Wise Men” and the “Group of Experts,” the proposed committee was to consist of 
seven members and an executive director located in Washington D.C.  While the group would 
have access to IDB and ECLA consultants, the final decisions on funding would ultimately rest 
with the seven person standing committee.159   
 Argentina immediately expressed opposition to the U.S.’s Wise Men proposal and 
threatened to vote against it.  The delegation stressed that such a committee infringed upon the 
sovereignty of Latin American countries.  The Argentines argued that it was the sovereign right 
of each nation to establish its own economic policies and programs without interference or 
pressures from outside governments.  President Arturo Frondizi explained that, “…the United 
States and international organizations also have a heavy bureaucracy and many times have no 	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clear idea of the true needs of our countries.”160  Argentina made the case that a group of 
economic “experts” from a variety of different nations could not possibly understand the 
intricacies of development obstacles facing each Latin American country. For this reason, the 
delegation stood in staunch opposition to the U.S.’s original Group of Experts proposal. 
A U.S. newspaper report called Argentina’s challenge the “major dispute blocking the 
launching of President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress program.”161  Like in earlier 
disagreements, Argentina did not stand alone for long.  Brazil quickly agreed to co-sponsor a 
new proposal.  Chile, Mexico, and Peru joined in as well, fighting to maintain their autonomy.162  
With the added support of these other nations, Dillon reported that Argentina’s rejection of the 
seven Wise Men, “effectively tied our hands.”163  The U.S. was powerless against Argentina and 
its other economically powerful allies.  Again, Latin American countries obstructed U.S. plans 
and took control of a significant portion of the Alliance for Progress planning. 
 The delegations at the conference spent 20 hours re-constructing the Group of Experts to 
take Argentina’s concerns into account.164  The final committee, as defined in the Charter of 
Punta del Este, diverged significantly from the original.  Rather than a standing committee of 
seven members, the Charter of Punta del Este established a varying group of nine experts from 
countries representing “a fair geographic spread.”165  Governments would then elect three 
members from the committee and three outside “experts” of their choosing, typically hailing 	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from their own countries.  The six-member ad-hoc group reviewed development plans and then 
recommended actions and funding.  The committee did not have the power to make a binding 
decision on funding or the legitimacy of proposed programs.166 
 The new structure of the Group of Experts shifted the bulk of the influence away from the 
United States, transferring more to Latin Americans.  The Charter of Punta del Este specified 
that the Secretary General of the OAS, the President of the IDB, and the Executive Secretary of 
ECLA would each nominate three of the members of the new group of nine.167  In the original 
proposal, the OAS handled all the nominations.  Splitting the nominating responsibilities reduced 
the OAS’s role in the planning approval process.  This is especially noteworthy considering that 
Latin Americans commonly accused the United States of controlling the OAS.  With this in 
mind, restructuring the Group of Experts effectively diminished U.S. power over the committee.   
In addition to limiting the power of the U.S.-controlled OAS, Argentina’s new committee 
elevated the position of an exclusively Latin American organization.  By giving ECLA three 
nominations, the Charter spread out the authority over the selection of the Wise Men to better 
represent Latin American interests.  ECLA had already demonstrated it could hold its ground in 
disagreements with the U.S.  The United States opposed the organization upon its founding, but 
even in the face of the U.S.’s disapproval, ECLA continued to operate to serve regional needs.  
The more equal distribution of nominating power had primarily symbolic significance.  
The new structuring of the Wise Men effectively stripped the nine committee members of 
authority.  Ultimately, the nominated experts’ opinions only accounted for half of the final 
recommendation.  The other votes came from the experts temporarily serving on the ad-hoc 
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committee, those chosen specifically by the applicant country.  This setup achieved Argentina’s 
goal of ensuring that experts with extensive knowledge of a country’s needs and interests 
determined the assessment of its development plans.  In the case that a country disliked the ad-
hoc committee’s review, the Charter of Punta del Este did not obligate the nation to submit the 
proposal to any international funding entity.168  Even after the IDB or USAID received a 
committee report, the recommendations were not binding—the Charter of Punta del Este only 
assigned “great importance” to the Wise Men’s review.169  The rhetorical vagueness in the 
establishment of the Group of Experts gave each country license to interpret the guidelines as it 
saw fit.  The one undeniably explicit phrase stated, “The ad-hoc committee shall not interfere 
with the right of each government to formulate its own goals, priorities, and reforms in its 
national development programs.”170  This reflected precisely Argentina’s initial argument against 
the U.S.’s Wise Men proposal and guaranteed the protection of each country’s sovereignty 
throughout the planning and approval processes.   
 The committee of nine was a central part of the operating mechanisms of the Alliance for 
Progress.  The fact that the co-proposal by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru 
determined the makeup and functioning of the group meant that Latin American countries 
determined a critical component of the program.  Moreover, they did so in a way that 
emphasized Latin American autonomy, preserved national sovereignty, and symbolically 
balanced U.S. and Latin American power.  The outcome of the Wise Men dispute contributed 
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tremendously to Latin American efforts to assert their agency within the Alliance for Progress 
and had a considerable structural and procedural effect on the project’s operations. 
  The final major Latin American influence on the Charter of Punta del Este was powerful 
through absence—the documents produced at the conference said nothing about condemning 
Cuba or communism.  Although there were sections that called for, “free men working through 
the institution of representative democracy,” and stated that the signatory countries should 
operate, “under freedom and democracy,” there was no mention of “communism,” nor any 
strong allusions to Castro’s Cuba.171  The vision outlined in Kennedy’s March 13 speech had 
been saturated with anti-communist messaging.  Without such language in the Charter of Punta 
del Este, the founding document took emphasis away from U.S. political motives to better focus 
on Latin American development goals. 
 The U.S. delegation in Punta del Este had to handle the subject of communism 
delicately.  After Adlai Stevenson’s June tour of Latin America, he recommended that the United 
States try to decrease the image of an obsession with Cuba and instead, appear to be 
concentrating entirely on economic and social development.172  The U.S. was careful to avoid 
over-mentioning Cuba or communism at the conference, but that did not mean that the island 
nation was no longer a priority.  Despite a façade of ambivalence in Punta del Este, communism 
in Cuba remained a main concern for the United States.   
To continue to discretely push the communist issue, the United States enlisted the help of 
Peru.  Peru was one of the few nations at the conference to have broken diplomatic ties with 
Cuba.  Taking advantage of this, the United States encouraged the Peruvian delegation to 	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sponsor a motion for harsher language denouncing communism and the Cuban Revolution.  
Argentina and Brazil quickly crushed the proposal.173 After his tour, Adlai Stevenson gave a 
press conference in which he conjectured that there would be no collective action against Cuba 
in Punta del Este without the support of at least two out of the three Latin American powers—
referring to Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.174  By Stevenson’s logic, Argentina and Brazil’s 
opposition to Peru’s proposal destroyed United States hopes of Pan-American consensus against 
Cuba.   
Brazil and Argentina further troubled the United States by actively including the Cuban 
delegation at the conference.  Che Guevara, the head of the delegation, caused a stir with a few 
provocative speeches at the beginning of the proceedings.175  For the rest of the sessions, 
however, the Cuban delegates were actively involved and less dramatic, participating in 
discussions and proposing over a dozen amendments to the Charter.176  U.S. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Arturo Morales Carrión, remarked that, at the 
conference, “Cubans were accepted and even popular to a degree.”177  This was especially true of 
Brazil.  The head of the Brazilian delegation, Minister of Finance Clemente Mariani actually 
moved for Cuba to sign the charter.178  He backed Guevara in a number of other instances as 
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well, arguing that Cuba was neither an enemy nor a threat to Latin America.179  On his way home 
to Cuba, Che stopped in Brazil to visit President Quadros, where Quadros bestowed an award 
upon the Cuban revolutionary.180 President Frondizi of Argentina also met with Guevara.  They 
conversed for approximately an hour and a half at the President’s residence in Buenos Aires. 
Guevara wanted Argentina to broker a truce between Cuba and the United States, but Frondizi 
explained that Kennedy would never agree to negotiations.181  Even though Frondizi offered no 
assistance to Cuba at the meeting with Guevara, the act of receiving the Cuban delegate 
acknowledged Cuba as a nation, and therefore, was in opposition to the United States’ stance 
against the country. 
Argentina and Brazil’s fraternization with Che Guevara at the conference was bold.  It 
clearly defied the wishes of the United States, the supplier of the majority of Alliance for 
Progress aid.  Both Brazil and Argentina had vocally supported the Alliance for Progress and 
expected to receive significant funding through the program.  Therefore, the countries took a risk 
in deciding to ignore U.S. anti-Cuban pressures.  Their actions suggested that Brazil and 
Argentina did not feel intimidated by the United States.  They recognized the sway they held as 
the two largest Latin American economies.  Through their inclusion of Cuba, Brazil and 
Argentina helped to keep communism and the Cuban Revolution out of Alliance proceedings—
separating the issue from the program more so than it had been in earlier U.S. articulations.   
 Keeping a somewhat friendly relationship with Cuba and a neutral stance on communism 
at the conference benefitted Argentina and Brazil in other ways as well.  Both had trade 	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negotiations with communist countries.  Moreover, as discussed in Chapter II, the Bay of Pigs 
exposed a U.S. weakness, and Latin American countries used their position on communism as 
diplomatic leverage.182  Overall, by not taking sides in the affairs between Cuba and the United 
States, Brazil and Argentina protected their national sovereignties, preserved lucrative trade 
relationships, and increased their diplomatic bargaining power. 
 The final version of the Charter of Punta del Este was 26 pages long and incorporated 75 
resolutions and 79 amendments that were not present in the initial drafts.  All of the countries 
present, excluding Cuba, signed the document, pledging to work together to improve the 
economic and social conditions of Latin America.  The introductory document to the Charter, 
“The Declaration to the Peoples of America,” outlined goals for industrialization, income 
redistribution, agricultural productivity and reform, literacy, health, and the improvement of 
major economic indicators.  The smaller details within the charter hinted at the nearly two weeks 
of negotiations, which Douglas Dillon had called, “a hectic merry-go-round.”183  The charter’s 
particulars reflected Latin American influence.  The designation of an aid figure locked in the 
long-term financial participation of the United States and other international aid organizations.  
The smaller countries had their own victory when they secured the clause for immediate aid 
assistance.  The larger countries used their sway to ensure that the structure of the Wise Men 
committee would represent the interests of each Latin American nation, rather than those of the 
U.S.   
Finally, Latin American countries kept anti-communist language out of the charter, 
focusing the program’s mission to be primarily one of economic development.  All of these 
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aspects of the charter served to redistribute the power over the Alliance, either by increasing 
Latin American authority, or decreasing U.S. control.  The negotiations at Punta del Este and the 
resulting charter prove that Latin American actions were instrumental in the formation of the 
Alliance for Progress.  The Latin American delegations fought U.S. pressures to ensure that the 
founding documents of the aid program represented their nations’ interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
EPILOGUE 
THE EXPULSION OF CUBA FROM THE OAS 	  
Only five months after the Conference of Punta del Este, on January 22, 1962, the 
members of the OAS reconvened.  This time, the larger Latin American nations could not protect 
Cuba’s position within the Pan-American organization.  With the 14 minimum votes necessary, 
the delegations passed a resolution to exclude Cuba from the OAS, a narrow victory for the 
United States.  Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia stood their ground, 
abstaining from the vote and reaffirming their devotion to the principles of national sovereignty, 
non-intervention, and the right to self-determination.  Upset by their continued resistance, the 
United States began to refer to the holdouts as the “soft six.”        
 This development calls into question some of the arguments in this thesis—specifically in 
Chapters II and III.  If the United States obtained the collective Latin American support it wanted 
at the January conference, did Latin Americans really have leverage after the Bay of Pigs 
incident?  Or, was the United States just waiting for the political fallout from the invasion to 
subside before wielding its full power and pressuring Latin American nations to act against 
Cuba? 
I contend that the arguments proposed in Chapters II and III still hold.  The aftermath of 
the Bay of Pigs did increase Latin American bargaining power at the August 1961 conference.  
Furthermore, Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS five months later did not devalue Latin American 
diplomatic victories at the Conference of Punta del Este. 
While it is true that the United States pushed harder for action against Cuba at the 
January conference, this was not the deciding factor in the attitude shift against Castro’s 
government.  During the first conference, Fidel Castro had still not referred to his revolution as 
75 
“communist,” even though the United States continually asserted that it was.  For this reason 
many Latin American countries could not justify censuring Cuba.  Moreover, they did not see the 
country as a danger.  The Mexican ambassador to the United States explained how Latin 
Americans perceived Cuba when he said, “If we publicly declare that Cuba is a threat to our 
security, forty million Mexicans will die laughing.”184 
The idea of Cuba as a threat lost some of its humor for many Latin America countries 
when, on December 2, Castro confirmed U.S. claims and announced, “I am a Marxist-Leninist 
and shall be a Marxist-Leninist until the end of my life.”185  Although not as zealous as the U.S., 
many Latin American governments were wary of communism.  In the younger, unstable 
democracies, revolution was a legitimate threat.   
Anti-communist pressures also came from within the state.  Conservative militaries and 
the Catholic Church—both vocally opposed to communism in most countries—strongly 
encouraged governments to take a stance against Cuba.186  Castro’s speech intensified their 
demands and certain governments were forced to act.  On December 9, Colombia broke 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, followed by Panama five days later.187 
Even the “soft six” felt unease following Castro’s admission.  Brazilian Ambassador to 
the United States, Roberto Oliveira Campos proclaimed that Brazil did not approve of Cuba’s 
relationship to the communist bloc.188  The Brazilian government had friendly relations with 	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Soviet countries, so Campos’ announcement was likely in response to internal pressures.  When 
preparing for the January conference, the Chilean government originally decided to vote against 
a motion to revoke Cuba’s OAS membership.  After Castro’s speech, the President of Chile 
directed the delegation to abstain instead.189  Even though they did not vote for Cuba’s expulsion 
from the OAS, the “soft six” did vote for a resolution that condemned Marxism-Leninism, 
demonstrating that anti-communist pressures were widespread and powerful within Latin 
American countries.190  
Most of the countries that voted to exclude Cuba from the OAS did so to protect their 
own interests.  Many of the small, Central American nations that made up most of the 14 votes 
were geographically closer to Cuba and worried that Castro’s revolution might spread, 
threatening their governments with potential uprisings.  Other countries supported the U.S. 
position in exchange for aid money.  Haiti had been one of the undecided nations.  Ironically, the 
United States flipped the Latin American leverage strategy on itself, promising the Haitian 
delegation Alliance for Progress aid in return for its vote.  After accepting the U.S. offer, Haiti 
went to work on a $2.8 million runway for its Port Au Prince airport.191  Potential aid also drove 
Colombian actions.  Colombia had organized the conference and motioned for Cuba’s expulsion, 
fulfilling President Alberto Lleras Camargo’s promise to the United States to gather support 
against Cuba in exchange for Alliance for Progress aid.192  His strategy worked, and Colombia 
gained favor with the U.S. government.  The U.S. State Department “singled out [Colombia] as a 	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leading country in the Alliance,” and the nation received some of the largest loans in the first few 
years of the program.193  For Colombia, the January 22 conference was a continuation of the 
bargain it struck with the United States in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.  It gave the country 
further Alliance for Progress advantages, rather than negating those obtained in Punta del Este in 
August. 
Although the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS appears to diminish the significance of 
Latin American resistance to anti-Cuban pressures five months earlier, when examined more 
closely, it is clear that this is not the case.  The argument presented in Chapter II that the Bay of 
Pigs increased Latin American diplomatic power in its August 1961 Alliance for Progress 
dealings is still valid.  This is, in part, demonstrated by the fact that the United States’ power and 
influence at the follow-up conference was not noticeably stronger.  Fidel Castro’s communist 
declaration arguably influenced Latin American countries to take action against Cuba at the 
January conference more than U.S. pressures did.  Both Colombia and Haiti exchanged their 
support for foreign aid, continuing the practice started in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.  
Furthermore, the U.S. victory against Cuba was only a narrow one.  The “soft six” that abstained 
from the vote represented approximately 60% of Latin America’s population, demonstrating that 
the United States still did not have a strong hold over the majority of the region.194  The vote to 
exclude Cuba from the OAS represented changing Latin American attitudes and interests more 
than it exhibited U.S. power in Latin America. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Ibid., 155. 
 
194 Ibid., 153. 
78 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis aimed to prove that Latin Americans were assertive, active participants during 
the founding year of the Alliance for Progress.  In Chapter I, I made the case that dovetailing 
U.S. and Latin American development theories facilitated cooperation in the early phase of the 
Alliance for Progress.  Structuralist economists collaborated with modernization theorists, 
infusing the U.S.-sponsored program with uniquely Latin American ideas.  John F. Kennedy’s 
founding speech showcased these ideas while demonstrating U.S. willingness to compromise; it 
garnered much-needed Latin American support following a decade of rising anti-American 
sentiment.       
In Chapter II, I argued that the Bay of Pigs threatened this support and changed the U.S.-
Latin American relationship in the context of the Alliance for Progress.  The invasion revealed 
that the U.S. prioritized its anti-communist, anti-Cuban objectives over Latin American interests.  
The Latin American public responded negatively, demonstrating distrust of the United States and 
desire for the rights to sovereignty and self-determination.  Latin American governments 
leveraged the exposed U.S. anti-communist obsession to protect these principles and advance 
their nations’ goals. 
 Finally, in Chapter III, I claimed that Latin American delegations at the Conference of 
Punta del Este pushed the United States to concede to their demands by joining forces, citing 
international principles, and taking advantage of U.S. weaknesses.  In the process, Latin 
Americans preserved national sovereignty, secured U.S. financial commitments, and promoted 
their economic aims above U.S. political goals.  The Charter of Punta del Este documented their 
accomplishments. 
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 The recognition of Latin American input and influence in the construction of the Alliance 
for Progress reveals “the other side” of the history of Cold War U.S.-Latin American relations.  
By emphasizing how Latin American decisions and actions affected diplomacy, this thesis 
attempted to contribute to literature following a relatively recent historiographical trend—one in 
which the U.S. role is not the primary focus. 
Through this approach, I provided evidence that traditional assumptions levied against 
underdeveloped countries did not apply to the Latin American nations involved in the founding 
of the Alliance for Progress.  Latin American ideas were not backward, nor deficient.  The 
region’s intellectuals were some of the foremost development theorists of the time.  Latin 
American diplomats and politicians cited international principles of self-determination, 
intellectual independence, national sovereignty, and non-intervention—ideas that were central to 
the governmental systems of most developed countries.  Latin Americans were not submissive, 
nor easily manipulated.  They made cautious, calculated decisions and stood up for their nations’ 
interests.  When pressured by the United States, they stood their ground.   
Analysis of Latin American agency in Cold War inter-American diplomacy has broader 
implications for present-day U.S.-Latin American relations, international development, and 
foreign aid.  This thesis specifically emphasized the importance of recognizing the role of 
developing nations in international development initiatives.  Although the United States 
government avowed that the Alliance for Progress was “a vast cooperative effort,” a program 
emphasizing Latin American “self-help” and “political freedom,” the rhetoric did not match the 
reality.195  Looking back on the program, Lincoln Gordon, one of Walt Rostow’s contemporaries 
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at CIS, said, “On the United States’ side, we erred in not promoting from the very beginning, 
arrangements appropriate to a more genuine partnership.”196   
 In many ways, both sides erred by not better defining the partnership into which they 
were entering.  When determining the ideological framework for the Alliance for Progress, Latin 
American and U.S. intellectuals collaborated over theoretical similarities, but ignored significant 
discrepancies—such as the promotion of democracy inherent to modernization and irrelevant to 
structuralism.  As a result, Latin American countries initially underestimated the importance the 
United States placed on anti-communism as a component of the Alliance.   
The United States also underestimated Latin American countries.  Not completely 
understanding the historical and political context into which it was entering, the U.S. went ahead 
with an unprovoked invasion on Latin American soil.  Over a decade of U.S. absence in the 
region built up anti-American sentiment and a strong sense of independence.  A better 
understanding of this environment and the recent history of the region would have made it easier 
to recognize that Latin American nations would have overwhelmingly negative responses to the 
Bay of Pigs.  Interestingly, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Kennedy’s adviser who did realize this and 
worked the hardest to persuade the president against the invasion, was a historian.  
The Alliance for Progress marked a shift in international development and foreign aid 
policy.  As historian Jeffrey F. Taffet argues, it was the first instance in which the United States 
began associating aid and development efforts with the promotion of political and moral values, 
rather than purely economic advancement.197  This thesis demonstrated how an over-emphasis on 
American political interests has the ability to negatively affect diplomatic relationships.  In the 
context of the Alliance for Progress, the U.S.’ anti-Cuban vendetta lost Latin American trust, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Lincoln Gordon, The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective, “Hopes and Fears,” 78.  
197 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy.  
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Latin American nations resorted to less civil tactics to protect their rights and secure the 
development funding they needed.  Advancing American values continues to be a critical 
component of U.S. foreign aid policy.  A better understanding of how Latin Americans reacted to 
U.S. political motives during the founding of the Alliance for Progress, the program that first 
utilized the current U.S. foreign aid approach, can therefore, shed light on how U.S. foreign aid 
policy affects relations with developing countries today. 
 This examination of the origins of the Alliance for Progress and the way in which Latin 
American-U.S. relations developed during 1961 demonstrated the risks nations assume when 
they do not fully appreciate the ideological frameworks, historical contexts, and motives of their 
counterparts.  By focusing on similar ideas and goals and ignoring differences, Latin American 
nations and the United States assumed that the Alliance for Progress would follow a smooth 
trajectory—which was not the case.  By failing to establish a well-defined, transparent and 
communicative relationship from the earliest stages of the Alliance, the countries involved set 
themselves up for misunderstandings and conflict.  As the first instance of modern foreign aid 
strategy, there are many foreign policy insights to be gained from studying the interactions 
between Latin American countries and the United States during the founding year of the Alliance 
for Progress.   
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